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The purpose of this thesis is to determine what effect the growth of offsets, as a 
condition of sale of military articles, has had on the U.S. defense industrial base. These 
effects are measured by assessing how this trade practice has impacted the employment, 
trade, and competitiveness of the U.S. defense industry. Additionally, the present U.S. 
Government .policy.towards offsets is explained. Analytical data takenJrom both Office 
of Management and Budget and Department of Commerce reports are presented and 
analyzed. Interviews with large and small- to medium-sized business spokesmen, in 
addition to Department of Commerce experts, are presented to augment the quantitative 
results. Different levels of U.S. Government oversight are explained as well as their 
advantages and disadvantages. The macroeconomic effects of offsets on the U.S. defense 
industry are inconclusive. However, offsets do seem to impact the U.S. defense industry 
adversely at. the subcontractor level when specific industrial sectors are analyzed. Large 
defense contractors view offsets as a necessary marketing tool in order to maintain global 
competition. Most small- to medium-sized contractors do not support the use of offsets, 
claiming that they export jobs and work orders overseas, eroding the defense industrial 
base at the subcontractor level. 
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The Greek chronicler, Hemocrates, noted 2400 years ago that the ability to wage 
war - as well as to influence events in the world without using military power - depends 
to a large degree upon a nation's wealth. A strong productive base provides the means 
~d leverage for action and enhances a nation's ability to influence the outcome of 
international events. The Cold War, in large part, turned out to be a contest between the 
superpowers' productive and technological bases. While the United States experienced 
steady growth, the declining Soviet productive base could not support both the demands 
. ' 
of the military establishment and those of the Soviet people. Probably more than any 
other single factor; this poor economic performance let to the demise of the Soviet Union 
as a superpower and its subsequent dissolution as a state. (Abbott, 1996) 
. . 
Since the end of the Cold War, the United States Department of Defense (DoD) 
weapons procurement budget has declined significantly from a peak of $97 billion in 
1985 to $44 billion in 1998 (Wayne, 1998). Accompanying this drastic reduction in 
weapons procurement, American weapons manufacturers have had to rely more heavily 
on overseas business to market their wares. Although the U.S. has a strategic aim to arm 
its friends and allies with U.S. compatible equipment, the reduction in both defense sales 
and defense industry output has raised concerns. As Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition and Technology Paul G. Kaminski said in 1996, 
1 
Over the past 30 years, the changes in the industrial base that supports the 
U.S. defense establishment have been as dramatic as the changes in the 
world order since the demise of the Soviet Union. U.S. and Western 
European defense purchases have declined while commercial markets 
have expanded. The rapid growth of the commercial industrial sector is 
driven by a commercial market flourishing quite independently of the 
defense sector. (Kaminski, 1996) 
U.S. industries needing to stimulate overseas business have fostered the growth of 
a marketing tool known as "offsets." Offsets, whether direct or indirect, are ten.ns of a 
sale, whereby the purchasing country receives additional consideration beyond the 
military equipment itself. Realizing the leverage they have on American businesses who 
need to make a sale, foreign countries are requiring that these American businesses help 
"offset" the high costs of these weapons sales. Foreign buyers are extremely interested in 
not only purchasing the weapon system, but also improving their own industrial and 
economic positron. Countries require offsets· for a variety of reasons: to ease the burden 
of large defense purchases on their economy; to increase or preserve domestic 
employment; to obtain desired technology; and to promote targeted industrial sectors. 
Purchasing countries may require U.S. contractors to manufacture part of the weapon 
system in their country, invest directly in the country, transfer technology, or agree to 
purchase and market some of the country's own exports. For example, in selling an 
aerospace platform to Spain, the U.S. prime contractor is locally sourcing aircraft parts 
and related software (direct offsets), as well as taking back wine, chemicals, stone 
. products? canned fruit and vegetables, and motor vehicle parts as compensation (indirect . 
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offsets). Oftentimes, a country will not even consider a weapons purchase unless there is 
an offset provision written into the contract. (DISAM, 1989) 
This situation begs the question, What are the effects of these offset transactions 
on the U.S.' own economy? While the use of offsets may help generate overseas 
business, could their protracted use have negative effects on U.S. employment, the U.S. 
position as the world's technology leader, and the long-term trade position of the United 
States? If long-term negative effects are anticipated, what role, if any, should the Federal 
Government play in regulating these" offsets? 
B. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this thesis is to determine what effect the growth of military 
offsets, as a condition of sale of military articles, has had on the U.S. industrial base. The 
objectives are to determine why offsets have become so commonplace in military export 
transactions and assess their advantages and disadvantages to the U.S. defense industry 
and the U.S. economy as a whole. "The effect of these offset agreements will-be measured 
by assessing the impact this trade practice has had on the employment, trade, and 
competitiveness "of the U.S. defense industrial base. Additiomilly, the :position of the U.S. 
Government towards offsets will be explained and the" different levels of Government 
involvement in regulating offsets will be analyzed. 
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C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. Primary 
What are the long tenn advantages and disadvantages of utilizing offsets for the 
United States' industrial base? 
2. Subsidiary 
• What role do military offsets play in the United States' Security Assistance 
Program? 
• What trends exist in the growth rate of offsets with respect to U.S. military . 
sales in recent years? 
• How have offsets impacted U.S. employment? 
• How have offsets impacted U.S. industrial competitiveness? 
• How have offsets impacted U.S. trade? 
• What is the current U.S. Government's position on offsets? 
D. SCOPE 
This thesis analyzes the growth of direct and indirect offsets and U.S. defense 
industry's reaction to this growth. Although some may believe that the use of offsets may 
have adverse effects on the U.S. economy, the fact that U.S. businesses voluntarily enter 
into these agreements implies that the use of offsets has positive effects for these 
businesses. This thesis' goal is to determine the macro-economic effect of these 
transactions on the U.S. economy. Both empirical data and the opinions of industry 
representatives will be used to determine these effects. Empirical data is limited to years 
1980 through 1987 and 1993 through 1995. No data was collected during years 1988 
4 
through 1992 for two reasons: 1) the Office of Management .and Budget (OMB) 
determined that the results of their 1990 offsets study precluded the necessity of further 
data collection; and 2) offset data collection and reporting responsibilities switched from 
OMB to the Department of Commerce (DoC) during this period (DoC, 1998). Findings 
will be further categorized into those involving major defense contractors and smaller 
subcontractors. This thesis will examine overall trends and will not focus on specific 
industries or weapons purchasers. While in recent years other industrial and economic 
factors have effected the defense industrial base (for example, mergers of defense 
contractors), this thesis focuses' on how of sets have contributed to any defense industry 
trends. 
E. METHODOLOGY 
The methodology' for research for this thesis includes literature reviews, 
interviews with defense industry and Government representatives, and a review of U.S. 
Government documents related to offsets published by the Office of Management and 
Budget, Department of Commerce, and the Bureau of Export Analysis. The reports.from 
these Governm<?nt agencies will be analyzed to determine the growth in the use of offsets, . 
their impact on the defense industry, and their impact on the U.S. economy as a whole. 
This analysis will be based upon ·trend~ derived from empirical data and feedback 
obtained from defense industry representatives. A summary of the interviews with 
industry repres~ntatives can be found in Appendix A. Finally, the U.S. Government's 
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current position on offsets will be explained followed by descriptions and analyses of 
varying degrees of _Government intervention in the offset process. 
F. ORGANIZATION 
Chapter IT describes the background of security assistance as an element of foreign 
policy and examines its historical use by the United States. The security assistance 
programs of Foreign Military Sales and Commercial Sales are highlighted. This chapter 
also illustrates how offsets have evolved to become an essential element in the making of 
a sale to a foreign buyer. The differences between direct and indirect offsets is also 
explained. This chapter concludes with an explanation of the U.S. Government's current 
position on the use of offsets. 
Chapter ill is an empirical analysis of offset data collected by the Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB) and the Department of Commerce (DoC). This analysis 
includes the background of the studies; trends in both direct and indirect offset growth, 
and trends in employment, trade, and global competition for the U.S. industrial base from 
1980-1987 and 1993-1995. Although OMB reports ~ttempt to analyze the impact of 
offsets on employment, trade, and industrial. competition, DoC reports do riot contain· this 
analysis. A review of OMB's methodology is given followed by an explanation of the 
errors in their analysis. Methods of improving both the data collection and methodology 
of this study conclude the chapter. 
Chapter IV is an analysis of industrial reactions to offset growth. Data from both 
Bureau of Export Analysis surveys and interviews are used for this analysis. The analysis 
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focuses on how industry representatives see offsets impacting employment, trade, and 
global competition. This data is further divided into responses from large defense 
businesses and responses from medium and small defense businesses. 
Chapter V analyzes the role of the u.s. Government regarding offsets. The 
current Government position is explained, as are different levels of Government 
involvement. The advantages and disadvantages of these different levels of involvement 
are then analyzed. 
Chapter VI draws conclusions from these analyses and provides a summary on the 
impacts of offsets on the industrial base and industry concerns and attitudes regarding 
offsets. Additionally, recommendations are made as to how the U.S. Government should 
oversee the use of offsets. The chapter concludes with areas for further research. 
7 , . 
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II. BACKGROUND 
The ultimate goal of United States foreign policy is to bolster the country's 
national security. Through diplomacy and, sometimes, a show of force, the United States 
aims to maintain its national strength, revitalize our bond to allies, reduce the peril of 
nuclear war, build rational relationships with potential adversaries, help resolve regional 
conflicts, and enhance global cooperation. This is far from easy. Mter the end of the 
Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union, many potential adversa?es who became 
increasingly difficult to identify and monitor had replaced our traditional solitary foe. The 
increase in terrorism, the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and horrible €?thnic conflicts 
have both increased the United States' involvement in military operations other than war 
and made maintaining a consistent and positive foreign policy with both our allies and 
other nations a constant juggling act. 
A major tool of United States foreign policy is that of security assistance. 
Security ~sistance serves United States interests by assisting our friends and allies to 
acquire, maintain, and, if necessary, employ the capability. of self-defense.· Security 
assistance programs, ultimately, serve the United States by complementing its own 
defense posture and revitalizing allies. This chapter briefly describes the background of 
the United States' security assistance program and then discusses Foreign Military Sales, 
Commercial Sales, and the rationale and utilization of offsets. 
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A. SECURITY ASSISTANCE 
1. Definition 
Security Assistance is the group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance 
Act of 1961, as amended, and the Anns Export Control Act, as amended, or other related 
statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other 
defense related services, by grant, credit or cash sales, in furtherance of national policies 
and objectives. Not only is this policy designed to assist our allies, it also furthers U.S. 
interests by enhancing deterrence, strengthening alliances, promoting regional stability, 
helping ensure access to vital overseas military facilities, improving U.S. power 
projection and forward defense capabilities, and reinforcing' rehltionships in order to 
assure access to vital yet scarce raw materials. (DISAM,1989) 
Security Assistance is an umbrella temi made up of seven components: 
• Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and Foreign Military Construction 
• Commercial Sales Licensed under the Arms Export Control Act of 1968 
(AECA) . 
• The ~oreign Military Pricing Program 
• The Military Assistance Program 
• The International Military Education and Training (IMET) Program 
• The Economic Support Fund 
• Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) 
This thesis will concentrate on the first and second components: Foreign Military Sales 
and Commercial Sales. 
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2. . Security Assistance History 
Security Assistance has been a part of international relations as long as man has 
engaged in warfare. Whether motivated by economic goals or the realization that one 
combatant is preferable to another, security assistance aims to establish and reinforce 
relationships that are beneficial to the country providing the aid. ' 
This nation's first experience with security assistance was actually on the 
receiving end. During the Revolutionary War, the United States received arms and other 
military assistance from France, whose aim was to limit British expansion in the Northern 
Hemisphere. With the British entangled in a protracted war with the United States, 
France, could expand and reinforce its own economic and military position in North 
America. Following the Revolutionary War, the United States turned its attention to 
within its own borders - developing its political and economic structures and expanding 
its borders from coast to coast. Little effort was made to expand U.S. foreign relations 
much beyond commercial interests. Even after the acquisition of Guam, the Philippines, 
and Puerto Rico after the Spanish American War of 1898, the nation retained its 
isolationist stance and resisted foreign entanglements. (DISAM, 1989) 
With the onset of World War I, the United States, despite its declared neutrality, 
rapidly emerged as the leading participant in the international munitions trade. During 
the period of its neutrality (August 1914 through March 1917) the United States exported 
approximately $2.2 billion in war supplies to Europe. In fact, by 1920 the ~nited States 
accounted for more that 52 percent of the global arms exports. The fact that the United 
States ranked so high among the world's leading arms exporters caused a great 
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controversy that was reflected in much public debate and discussion throughout the 
1920's and 1930's. There was an uneasy concern throughout the country regarding the 
unwanted but thriving arms industry. (DISAM, 1989) 
Between World Wars, America's continued debate over its role as an arms 
merchant led to the establishment of a special Senate Munitions Investigating Committee 
in 1934. Headed by Senator Gerald Nye of North Dakota, an avowed isolationist, the 
Committee's task was to determine if a commercial profit motive was the primary cause 
and continued sustenance of war. The Committee recommended that the U.S. arms 
industry be nationalized in order to take away the opportunity for private gain. Although 
this recommendation was rejected, it did lead to the establishment of a Munitions Control 
Board which exercised greater Government control and oversight of the U.S. arms 
industry. (DISAM~ 1989) 
World War IT signaled a fundamental change in U.S. foreign. policy as it related to 
the arms trade. Prior to U.S. entry into World War IT, the Neutrality Act was revised in 
1939 allowing the sales of arms during peacetime to the British on a cash and carry basis. 
This policy was eventually broadened to include arms support for other allied nations. 
One of the most famous examples of arms support under this policy was the Lend~Lease 
program of 1941. Eventually providing about $50 billion of arms, food, and other aid to 
our allies, the Lend-Lease program "lent" materials to allies under the premise that it 
would be paid back· or replaced in kind by materials provided to the United States. 
(DIS AM, 1989) 
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The end of World War IT saw the rise of the two post war superpowers, the United. 
States and the USSR. Confronted with the diametrically opposed philosophy of 
. communism, post World War IT Presidents fonnulated doctrines to combat this new 
threat. President Truman requested Congress to appropriate $400 million to aid Turkey 
and Greece in combating a communist insurrection in March of 1947. Over the next 
three years, over $600 million in aid was given to these countries in the fonn of surplus 
U.S. arms. These were given free of charge as "grant aid" under the new Military 
Assistance Program. This policy, known as the Truman Doctrine, worked with other 
plans like the Marshall Plan to frustrate Soviet ·attempts to expand their military, 
economic, and political base. (DISAM, 1989) 
Possibly the most significant alliance that affected U.S. security assistance policy 
was the fonnation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949. The 
NATO alliance provided the foundation for increased and preferential treatment of 
NATO member countries for security assistance, to include: provisions of arms, 
exclusions from arms control legislation, and international cooperative armaments 
projects. This preferential treatment accounted for NATO countries receiving 
approximately 56 percent of all American arms transferred under the Military Assistance 
Program and the Foreign Military Sales Program in 1965. (DISAM,1989) 
During the 1950's, however, certain developments changed how assistance was 
provided. As World War IT stockpiles dwindled, U.S. aid.came in the fonn of technical 
assistance and industrial equipment to expand local European defense production. 
However, as each country's arms production capability increased, their government 
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demanded anns of local designs, development, and production to increase the self-, 
sufficiency of its anns production capability and economic development. NATO member 
countries were no longer satisfied with purchasing anns from the U.S., United Kingdom, 
and France on the traditional buyer-seller relationship. Instead, they were motivated by 
both national security and economic factors to develop their own inherent capability. 
The expansion of the U.s. containment policy, aimed primarily at curbing Soviet 
expansion, continued to grow by including the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and Latin 
. ' 
America. Broadened by doctrines such as the Eisenhower Doctrine, U.S. foreign policy 
expanded the containment strategy to apply to the protection not only of nations on the 
periphery of the Soviet Union, but of the world at large, including many nations regarded 
by their leaders as nonaligned. President Kennedy's "Alliance for Progress" provided 
. ' 
economic assistance to Latin America to 'create a stable social structure capable of 
fending off revolutionary threats~ with the implied objective of restraining the expansion 
of Cuban influence in the region. (DISAM, 1989) 
It was during the Nixon Administration that we find many of the features of 
present day U.S. security 'assistance policy formalized. Termed the Nixon Doctrine, this 
policy stated that, although the U.S. would continue to bear responsibility for the 
deterrence of nuclear and general war, the responsibility for localized wars remained the 
responsibility of those countries threatened by it. U.S. assistance would continue in the 
form of grant assistance and not necessarily military forces. This doctrine was mainly a 
, , 
product of the public reaction against the major but largely unsuccessful military 
intervention in Vietnam during the 1960's. However, U.S. transfer of anns to the Mid~le 
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East increased dramatically with Iran, Israel, and Saudi Arabia being the principal 
recipients. The U.S. foreign policy goal in this instance was to maintain a regional 
balance, primarily in order to maintain the flow of oil from this area. (DISAM, 1989) 
The Ford Administration was plagued with political trauma on the domestic front, 
continuing disagreements with the Soviets, and incipient recession. Complicated 
relationships with Congress arose, partly due to congressional pressure to restrain arms 
sales despite a high foreign demand for armaments. The President was faced with the 
dilemma of meeting requests for U.S. arms as part of our foreign policy while still 
remaining within the bounds of pending legislation. This new legislation, which reflected 
demands for greater controls on arms sales, found expression in the International Security 
Assistance and Arms Export Control Act (AECA) of 1976. This act was amended in 
1977, but was seen by both President Ford and President Carter as extremely restrictive 
and impinging on the Executive Branch's prerogative to implement foreign policy. 
(DISAM, 1989) 
President Carter, however, decried the unrestrained global spread of conventional 
weaponry citing that global arms sales had risen to over $20 billio~ annually with the 
U.S. accounting for over half of that amount. In. order to reverse the thrust of 
conventional arms sales, President Carter aruiounced that arms transfers would be viewed 
as an "exceptional foreign policy implement" and the burden of persuasion for sales 
would fallon those who fayored a particular arms sale, rather than those who opposed it. 
(DISAM, 1989) 
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On 8 July, 1981, President Ronald Reagan announced a new Conventional Arms· 
Transfer Policy that viewed arms transfers as an essential element of our global defense 
policy and an indispensable component of U.S. foreign policy. The new policy included 
the following points: 
• Reinforce military capabilities to assist in the deterrence of aggression, 
especially from the USSR and its surrogates, and reduce the requirements for 
direct U.S. involvement in regional conflict. 
• Reinforce the perception of friends and allies that the U.S., as partner, is also a 
reliable supplier with a measurable and enduring stake in the secUrity of the 
recipient country. 
• Point out to potential enemies that the U.S. will not abandon its allies or 
friends or allow them to be militarily disadvantaged. 
• hnprove the American economy by assuring a more stable defense production 
base, and by enhancing the balance of payments. However, this objective 
should not be construed that the approval of the transfer of arms will be based 
solely or even primarily on economic considerations or gain. 
• Enhance the effectiveness of the U.S. military through improved possibilities 
of access to regional bases, ports, or facilities needed for the support of 
deployed forces during contingencies. Further, security assistance should be 
such as to improve the ability of the host nations to complement U.S. forces 
during deployments. 
• Strengthen the stability of a region and the internal security of the countries 
therein by fostering a sense of a recipient nation's security and thereby its 
willingness to settle disputes amicably. Through this objective, it is held that 
a government that feels secure is more likely to cope with such challenges in a 
more progressive and enlightened manner. 
A pivotal point of the Reagan policy was that the U.S. could not alone defend western 
security interests. Thus, the U.S. would give urgent heed to the security requirements of 
friends and allies - not as an alternative to a U.S. commitment or capability but as a 
complement to it. The U.S. would assess the transfer of arms in light of the net 
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contribution such transfers would make to U.S. global or regional security. In the last 
decade, the Bush and Clinton Administrations' approaches to the use of security 
assistance as a means to support national interests has remained essentially unchanged, 
(DIS AM, 1989) 
3. Current Security Assistance Policies 
The U.S. security assistance program has its foundation in the U.S. public laws 
which provide security assistance auth~rizations and appropriations. Two basic acts are 
involved with respect to the current U.S. security assistance program. Both of these acts 
are amended either annually or biennially. 
The fIrst is the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) of 1961, as amended. The FAA 
was enacted on September 4, 1961, for five of the seven security assistance programs 
along with a wide variety of other foreign assistance programs. . 
The second act is the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), as amended. It actually 
came into being as the Foreign Military Sales Act of 1968 but was renamed in 1976 as the 
AECA. This act provides the authority for both Foreign Military Sales and commercial 
s.ales. Figure 1 shows the'major Security Assistance Authorization Acts that still legIslate 
Security Assistance policies. (DISAM, 1989) 
These Acts outline certain conditions in order for a country to be eligible for sales 
from the United States. A country is eligible if: 
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• the President finds that the furnishing thereof will strengthen the security of 
the U.S. and promote world peace. 
• the country has agreed not to transfer title to, or possession of, any 
articles/services, unless the consent of the President has been obtained. 
• the country has agreed to provide substantially the same degree of security 
protection afforded to such article or service by the U.S. Government. 
• the country is otherwise eligible to purchase defense articles/services. 
(DISAM, 1989) 
Additionally, there are several restrictions which will deny a country eligibility to 
receive arms sales from the U.S. No assistance shall be provided to countries that: 
• grant sanctuary to international terrorists: 
• are dominated or controlled by the international Communist movement. 
• are indebted to any U.S. citizen for goods or services. 
• nationalize, seize, or expropriate property owned or controlled by U.S. 
• • . • I •.CItIzens, corporatIOns, etc. 
• are in default on any loan to the United States in excess of six months. 
• are engaged in a consistent pattern of acts of intimidation or harassment 
directed against individuals in the U.S. 
• deliver or receive nuclear enrichment or reprocessing equipment, material, or 
tec~ology or transfer a nuclear device to a non-nuclear state. 
• sever diplomatic relations with the U.S. or with which the U.S. severs 
relations. 
• that prevents any U.S. person from participating in the provision of defense 
articles/services on the basis of race, religion, natural origin, or sex. 
• . that is engages in illicit drug production and has failed to take adequate steps 
to prevent such drugs from being sold to U.S. Government personnel or their 
dependents or from being smuggled into the U.S. 
• whose duly elected Head of Government is deposed by military coup or 
decree. 
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• which is in default to the United States for a period in excess of one calendar 
year on any foreign assistance/security assistance loan. 
• which is engaged in a consistent pattern of opposition to t~e foreign policy of 
the U.S. 
• the government of which engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of 
internationally recognized human rights. (DISAM,1989) 
In 1984, Congress enacted amendments to the Defense Production Act of 1950 which 
directed the President to submit an annual report to the Congress on the impact of offsets 
to the defense preparedness, industrial competitiveness, employment, and trade of .the 
United States. This report and its heretofore results will be discussed in Chapter ID. 
B. FOREIGN MILITARY SALES/COMMERCIAL SALES 
1. Foreign Military Sales 
a. Definition 
Foreign Military Sales (FMS) is defined as a non-appropriated program 
through which eligible foreign governments purchase defense articles, services, and 
training from the United States Government. (DISAM, 1989) 
b. FMS Process 
The FMS process begins when a foreign purchaser makes a request, via a 
Letter of Request (LOR), to the military department having cognizance over the defense 
article or service through normal U.S. diplomatic channels. Once the military department 
has received the LOR, the request is validated to ensure that the potential customer is an 
eligible FMS recipient, that the article or service requested may be sold, and that the 
request has been received through noimal channels. The Defense Security Assistance 
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Agency (DSAA) maintains a military article and services list (MASL) which identifies 
the military articles and services eligible for FMS. If the item requested is not on the 
MASL, a policy level decision must be made whether or not to make the sale. (DIS AM, 
1989) 
Once the LOR has cleared the initial screening, the military department 
will draft a Letter of Offer and Acceptance (LOA) which will be reviewed by the DSAA 
and Department of State. Specific dollar thresholds determine whether pre-sale 
congressional approval is required. If the sale involves major defense equipment less· 
than $14 million, other defense articles/services less than $50 million, or design and 
construction services less than $200 million, pre-sale congressional notification is not 
required and, once DSAA and Department of State approval is received, the FMS offer is 
made to the foreign country. However, if the .sale involves thresholds greater than those 
stated above, the President will submit a numbered certification to the Congress that 
includes the justification and impact of the sale once DSAA and the Department of State 
have reviewed the request. Congress then has 30 calendar days to adopt a joint resolution 
objecting to the sale. If a joint resolution is not ,adopted, then a Letter of Offer and 
Acceptance (LOA) stating the conditions of the sale is issued to the requesting 
government for its review and acceptance/rejection. In order to assist the Congress and 
provide them with sufficient time to review each case, the Defense Security Assistance 
Agency (DSAA) will provide the Congress with 20 days· advance notification of each 
case prior to the formal submission of statutory notification. 
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2. Commercial Sales 
a. Definition· 
Commercial Sales (also referred to as Direct Commercial Sales and 
Commercial Sales Licensed under the AECA) is a sale made by U.S. industry directly to a 
foreign buyer. The Commercial Sales agreement is not administered by the Department 
of Defense and does not involve a government-to-government agreement. U.S. 
Government control is accomplished through licensing by the Office of Munitions 
Control, Department of State. (DISAM, 1989) 
h. Commercial Sales Process 
A foreign purchaser will make a request for a defense item or service from 
a u.S. commercial source. As in the case ofFMS, cost thresholds determine the amount 
of review U.S. Government review and approval neededto facilitate the sale. If the cost 
of major defense equipment is less than $14 million or the cost of other defense articles or 
services is less than $150 million, once Department of State review and approval for the 
sale has been completed, an export license will be issued. 
However, if the sales involve costs exceeding those stated above, once 
Department of State approval has been received the President will submit a numbered 
certification to the Congress both describing 'and justifying the sale. The Congress will 
then have 30 calendar days to review the certification. If the Congress adopts a joint 
resolution objecting to the, sale within this tiIl.1e period, an export license will not be 
issued. If there is no objection, an export license will be granted. (DISAM, 1989) 
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The pril!lary difference between FMS and Commercial Sales has to do 
with the extent of Government involvement. With a FMS, the U.S. Government and the 
appropriate DOD agency is deeply involved from the receipt of the LOR to the delivery of 
the last shipment and receipt of the last bill. In Commercial Sales, U.S. Government 
involvement is limited to the initial approval process, after which the conduct of the sale 
and the extent of follow-on support is negotiated and settled between the U.S. 
commercial source and the foreign purchaser. Figure 2 shows a flow diagram of both the 
FMS and Commercial Sales Process. 
c. THE USE OF OFFSETS 
1. Definition 
Offsets are a range. of industrial compensation practices required as a condition of 
purchase in either government-to-government or commercial sales of defense articles 
and/or defense services as defined by the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) and the 
International Traffic in Arms Regulations (IT AR). Essentially, offsets in arms trade are 
arrangements which use some method of reducing the amount of currency needed to buy 
a military item or some means of creating revenue to help pay for it. The term.'.'offset" 
refers to a range of industrial or commercial compensation practices required as a 
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• Coproduction: overseas production' based upon government-to-government 
agreement that permits a foreign government or producer to acquire the 
technical information to manufacture all or part of a U.S. origin defense 
article. 
• Licensed Production: Overseas production of a U.S. origin defense artiCle 
based upon a transfer of technical information under direct commercial 
arrangements between a U.S. manufacturer and a foreign government or 
producer. 
• Subcontractor Production: Overseas production of a part or compon.ent of a 
U.S. origin defense article. 
• Overseas 'Investment: Investment arising from the offset agreement, taking the 
form of capital invested to establish or expand a subsidiary or joint venture in 
the foreign country. 
• Technology Transfer: Transfer of technology that occurs as a result of an 
offset agreement and. that may take the form of: research and development 
conducted abroad; technical assistance provided to the subsidiary or joint 
venture of overseas investment; or other activities under direct commercial 
arrang~ment between the U.S. manufacturer and a foreign entity. 
• Countertrade: An agreement involving the reciprocal purchase of civil or 
defense goods and services from the foreign entity as a condition of sale of 
military-related exports. 
• Counterpurchase: An agreement by the initial exporter to buy (or find a buyer . 
for) a specified value of unrelated goods from the original importer during a 
specified time period. 
• Compensation: An agreement by the original exporter to accept as full or 
partial repayment products derived from the original exported product. 
(DISAM, 1989) 
Offsets associated with mili~ary exports are further divided into two primary 
classifications: 
• Direct Offsets: Contractual arrangements that involve goods and services 
referenced in the sales agreement for military exports. 
• Indirect Offsets: Contractual arrangements that involve goods and servi<;es 
unrelated to the exports referenced in the sales a~eement. 
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2. Background on the Use of Offsets 
Since World War II, U.S. defense industries have been major players in the 
international arms market. Coproduction in the defense trade was initially encouraged by 
the U.S. Government to help re-build the war ravaged economies and industrial bases of 
Western Europe and Japan. Co-production and licensed pro~uction of U.S. weapons 
systems in foreign countries began in the late 1950's and early 1960's, with the NATO 
countries and Japan being the first countries to receive these production agreements. 
(DISAM, 1989) 
During the Cold War it was in the best interests of the United States to ensure that 
allied countries were strong militarily as well as economically. Offsets helped achieve 
important foreign policy and national security objectives of the U.S. such as increasing 
the industrial capabilities of allied countries, standardizing military equipment,and' 
modernizing allied forces. 
The use of offsets is now commonplace. Undersecretary of State Lynn Davis 
noted, "The demand for offsets is growing, with practically every arms purchaser 
demanding so~e form of offset" (F.A.S., 1994). Virtually ,all of the defense trading 
partners of the U.S. impose some type of offset requirement, and at times the stated value 
of the offset exceeds that of the sales contract. Countries require offsets for a variety of 
reasons: to ease the burden of large defense purchases on their economy; to increase or 
preserve domestic employment; to obtain desired technology; and to promote targeted 
industrial sectors. Many defense contractors report that they must fulfill these demands 
or risk losing a valuable sale. fu fact, many times defense exporters can not even submit 
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a bid proposal unless it includes an offset package. Further concerns are raised by the use" 
of offsets: is it adversely effecting the U.S. defense industrial base; what are the effects on 
U.S. employment; are offsets having a negative effect on the competitive position of U.S. 
defense industries; is U.S. national security being jeopardized by any transfers of 
technology associated with the use of offsets? Both the increased use of offsets, their 
effects on U.S. trade, employment, and global competition, and U.S. industry's reactions 
to offsets will be analyzed in Chapters III and IV of this thesis. (DIS AM, 1989) 
3. U.S. Government Policy on the Use of Offsets 
Until 1978, the Department of Defense negotiated offset arrangements between 
U.S. military equipment manufacturers and other countries in connection with FMS. 
However, the increasing difficulties associated with" administering offsets and the 
increasing pressure allies were bringing to bear for offsets led" to the 1978 "Duncan 
Memorandum. Issued by Deputy Secretary for Defense Charles Duncan, it specified that 
the Department of Defense would not be a PartY to satisfy commitments for offsets or 
compensatory coproduction. The memorandum stated: 
Because of the inherent difficulties in negotiating and implementing 
compensatory coproduction and offset agreements and the economic 
efficiencies they often entail, DOD shall not normally enter into such 
agreements. An exception will be made only when there is no feasible 
alternative to ensure the successful completion of transactions considered 
to be of significant importance to the United States national security 
interests. (DISAM,1989) 
This became the guiding principle in the formation of the U.S. Government's current 
policy regarding offsets. 
The U.S. Government policy on offsets is that "it is DOD policy not to enter into 
government-to-government offset arrangements because of the inherent difficulties in 
negotiating and implementing such arrangements" (DIS AM, 1989). However, DOD will 
not prohibit a defense contractor from negotiating and implementing its own offset 
agreement with a foreign government. Additionally, concerned with the potential 
political impact that offsets could have on the competitive position of U.S. industries, the 
Congress p~sed a. bill in 1984 that became an amendment to the Defense Production Act 
(PL 98-265) requiring the President to report annually on the impact of offsets on U.S. 
defense preparedness, industrial competitiveness, employment, and trade. Further 
Congressional action took place in 1989 when Congress addressed the issues of 
technology transfer and their affects on specific sectors of the U.S. industrial base. It 
required the President to enter into negotiations with foreign countries that have a policy 
of requiring offset arrangements in connection with the purchase of defense equipment or 
supplies from the United States in order to achieve an agreement to limit the adverse 
effects such arrangements have on the defense industrial base of each country. It also 
recommended that a national policy be established with respect to contractual offset 
arrangements. Further discussion and analysis of the role. of the U.S. Government 
regarding offsets will be conducted in Chapter V ofthis thesis. (DISAM, 1989) 
D.. SUMMARY 
This chapter has traced the history of U.S. security assistance policy and practice 
from its early days in the Revolutionary War to today. It has illustrated how this pol~cy 
, . 
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has contributed to both U.S. foreign policy and the national security of the United States. 
With the emergence of the United States as a superpower after World War IT and the 
commensurate desire to. contain communism, security assistance grew and became a· 
major component of U.S. foreign policy. fucreased congressional concern over the 
escalating level of arms sales led to the Foreign Assistance Act and the Arms Export 
Control Act, charging the Executive Branch with specific responsibilities and providing 
for security assistance management. These Acts, as amended, legislate how security 
assistance is presently conducted. 
The definitions and procedures for Foreign Military Sales and Commercial Sales 
were explained. The primary difference between these two methods of selling defense 
equipment or services to foreign buyers is that of U.S. Government involvement. The 
U.S. Government is involved in all aspects of approval and facilitation for a FMS. The 
U.S. Government is only involved during the approval stage for a Commercial Sale - it is 
then up to the commercial contractor to manage the remaining aspects of the transaction. 
The concept, definition, and background of military offsets were then explained. 
u: sed originally as a method to help re-build. the industrial and economic bases of Western 
Europe and Japan after World War IT, they have evolved into a commonplace practice 
through which foreign purchasers can reduce the amount they are paying for an item by 
reducing the amount of currency needed or creating revenue to help pay for it. More and 
more, foreign purchasers. are requiring offset provisions in every contract and U.S. 
contractors, needing to make a sale, are reluctantly agreeing to them. The U.S. 
Government's official policy is not to encourage or commit to offsets in connection with 
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the sale of defense g90ds or' services to foreign governments. However, the U.S. 
Government will not limit the negotiating and'implementing rights of U.S. industry in 
establishing offset arrangements with foreign buyers of U.S. goods and services. 
Ironically, while the U.S. Government's policy is to avoid offsets, in recent years the 
amount of U.S. Government oversight and monitoring of this trade practice has increased 
due to growing concerns regarding the effects of offsets on the U.S. defense industrial 
base, employment, global competitiveness, and technology transfer to other nations. An 
analysis of offset growth and its effects on the employment, trade, and competitiveness of 
the U.S. defense industrial base will be given in the next chapter. 
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III. ANALYSIS OF OFFSET GROWTH, THE OMB AND DOC 
STUDIES 
This chapter will examine the trends in total, direct, and indirect offset growth. 
This analysis will focus on offset data collected by the Department of Commerce (DoC) 
from 1993-1995 although data previously collected by OMB will be presented in order to 
see if any long-term trends are discemable. While OMB reports covering offset growth 
from 1980-1987 did include analyses of how. offsets impacted employment, trade,' and 
global competition in the U.S. i~dustrialbase, the DoC's 1993-1995 reports on offsets did 
not include any quantitative analysis on how offsets may have impacted these areas. This 
chapter will discuss why the DoC did not include this analysis and methods by which 
these complicated relationships can be analyzed in future studies. The majority of the . 
. ( 
numerical information contained in this chapter is drawn from the 1997 DoC study of 
offsets in the defense trade. The source for all data presented is the DoC study unless 
otherwise noted. All monetary amounts have been converted into constant 1996 dollars 
by using the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) deflator. 
A. BACKGROUND 
In 1984 Congress enacted amendments' to the Defense Production Act of 1950, as 
amended, which included the addition of Section 309. This new section required the 
President to submit annually to the Committee on Banking,'Finance, and Urban Affairs of 
the House of Representatives and the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban 
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Affairs of the Senate a report on the impact of offsets on the defense preparedness, 
industrial competitiveness, employment, and trade of the United States. 
When Section 309 was first enacted, OMB was appointed as the interagency· 
coordinator in the preparation of the annual offsets report for the Congress. These reports 
were to be prepared in consultation with the Departments of Commerce, Defense, and 
Labor, and the Office of the United States Trade Representative. This interagency 
reporting requirement continued, with .minor adjustments, until 1992, when Section 309 
underwent major modifications. The interagency coordination role was transferred from 
OMB to the Secretary of Commerce. In addition, the Secretary was given the authority to 
develop and administer regulations to collect the offset data required for the report from 
u.S. industry. This responsibility was later delegated to the Department's Bureau of 
Export Administration (BXA). Another significant change was ·made in Section 309 by 
reducing the sales reporting threshold previously cited in the National Defense 
, 
Authorization Act for fiscal year 1991 from $50 million to $5 million for U.S. firms 
entering into foreign defense sales contracts subject ~o offset agreements. On a per-
n:ansaction level, firms must report all offset transactions which exceed $250,000 .. The 
first industry reports were submitted to BXA before March 15, 1995, and covered offset 
transactions valued at $250,000 or more completed during calendar year 1993, as well as. 
information regarding new offset agreements entered into during the year. After this 
initial submission, companies provided an additional filing by June 14, 1995, covering 
calendar year 1994. All subsequent annual filings will be due on June 15 of each year. 
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The OMB reports from 1985 to 1990 (which collected and analyzed data from 
1980-1987) highlighted a growing trend in offset demands by buying countries around the 
world for both direct offsets (related to the weapon sale) and indirect offs~ts (not related 
to the sale, such as non-defense related investment projects). During this period, indirect 
offset demands expanded dramatically beyond the defense and aerospace sectors to affect 
other industries such as automobiles, semiconductors, software, and telecommunications. 
The 1990 report concludes that while offsets are an aberration of the free market 
mechanism, they are slightly favorable or at least neutral in their effects on the u.s. 
defense industrial base. From a macroeconomic level in the areas of industrial 
competitiveness, employment, and trade, the u.s. comes out slightly ahead. 
Specifically, OMB reported that overseas military sales that contractually require 
offsets are likely to have a net increase in doinestic employment of 2,500 employees per 
year. OMB admits, however, that specific contractors or subcontractors may suff~r 
declines in domestic employment due to offset agreements; however, these declines are 
likely to be countered by equal or greater employment gains in other sectors of the u.S. 
economy. (OMB, 1990) 
The OMB analysis concluded that the effect of the transactions discussed in their 
report had an overall positive effect for U.S. trade. The total billings of $19.8 billion in 
1980-1987 compared to total offset implementations for that period of $10.7 billion. 
Offset agreements were strongly positive for most aerospace industries such as aircraft, 
radars, and aircraft engines. However, in the aircraft parts, electronic components, basic 
steel, and industrial machinery sectors, the net trade effects were negative. (OMB, 1990) 
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With regard to how offsets effect the U.S.' global position in the defense industry, . 
OMB's study concluded that military exports and their associated offsets play a minor 
role in terms of the overall output of defense and non-defense industries. Where they do 
have an effect, they generally result in net increases in output in the most technologically 
advanced sectors. (OMB, 1990) 
The 1990 OMB study on the effects of offsets was the most comprehensive 
macro-economic study conducted by any private or public organization on the subject. 
However, their methodology for both collecting data and arriving at their conclusions did 
contain serious flaws. A discussion of these flaws and possible solutions will be 
conducted later in this chapter. 
B. DOC SURVEY RESULTS 
1. Trends in Overall Offset Growth 
As Table 1 shows, the percentages of offset obligations to new export contract 
values fluctuates widely from year to year, as do the monetary values of the export sales 
contracts and offset obligations. The lowest percentage occurred in 1993 at slightly under 
35 percent and the highest in 1987 at over 98 percent. New offset obligations in 1993 
were $4.8 billion based on sales contracts of $13.9 billion resulting in an offset 
percentage of slightly under 35 percent. In 1994, new offset obligations were $2.0 
billion based on on sales contracts of $4.8 billion resulting in an offset percentage of 
slightly under 42 percent. In 1995, offset obligations were $6.0 billion on sales of $7.4 
billion resulting in an offset percentage of just over 81 percent. Just as the percentage of 
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offset obligations to new export contract values has grown from 1993 to 1995, so has the 
number of offset agreements being made. In 1993,29 new offset agreements were report-
Offset Obligations: Selected Years 
(in billions) 
Year Export Contracts Offset Obligations Offset Percent 
1980 12.3 6.8 55.3% 
1981 4.2 3.7 88.1% 
1982 4 1.6 40.0% 
1983 12.8 6.5 50.8% 
1984 8 3.2 40.0% 
1985 5.2 3.2 61.5% 
1986 2.9 1.4 48.3% 
1987 3.9 3.8 97.4% 
1988 * * * 
1989 * * * 
1990 * * * 
1991 * * * 
1992 * *. * 
1993 13.9 4.8 34.5% 
1994 4.8 2 41.7% 
1995 7.4 6 81.1% 
*No data collected 
Table 1. Offset Obligations: Selected Years. 
ed by 18 companies. In 1994,49 new agreements were made by 18 companies. Finally, 
in 1995, 4~ new agreements were made by 19 companies. Figure 1 graphically shows the 
percentage of offset obligations as coinpared to total export c;ontracts. While .there is a 
high degree of fluctuation (specifically for years 1981, 1987, and 1995), total offset offset 
obligations tend to remain in the 40 percent to 60 percent region of total contracts made. 
As previously noted, offsets take a variety of different forms and can effect 
virtually any industry. Table 2 shows how selected Standard Industrial Classification 
(SIC) industry groups were reported in offset transactions for 1993-1995. These groups 
represent the largest total values of offsets reported by· industry~ The percentages do not 
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total to exactly 100 percent since there is some overlap among the different 
classifications. For example, SIC codes 372 (aircraft and parts) and 3731 (ship building 
and repair) are both included under code 37 (transportation equipment). 
PERCENT OF OFFSET OBLIGATIONS COMPARED TO 
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Figure 3. Offset Obligations Compared to Total Export Contracts. 
Selected SIC Industry Groups Reported in Offset Transactions, 1993-1995 
SIC Code Industry Description #of· Actual Value % of Total Trans. 
37 Transportation Equipment 733 3,3.10,540,080 50.9% 
Many Aerospace related products 752 3,230,105,780 49.6% 
and services 
372 Aircraft and Parts 684 2,786,373,831 42.8% 
36 Electrical Machinery and Equipment 290 831,037,382 12.8% 
35 Industrial Machinery, except Electrical. 223 649,449,413 10.0% 
367 Electronic Components 198 545,223,047 8.4% 
61 Bank Credit 25 390,013,427 6.0% 
3731 Ship Building and Repair 20 346,683,000 5.3% 
366 Communications Equipment 35 139,703,152 2.2% 
Percentages do not total to 100 because there is overlap among the SIC codes shown. 
Table 2. Selected SIC Industries Reported in Offset Transactions, 1993-1995. 
36 
Table 3 presents an overview of industry related transactions by offset type for 
1993, 1994, and 1995. As discussed in Chapter 2, offset requirements can be fulfilled in a 
number of ways. Table 3 categorizes these offset types as. purchase, technology transfer, 
co-production, subcontractor activity, training, licensed assembly, credit transfer, 
investment, and others. The "others" category includes marketing assistance, equipment 
maintenance agreements, rentals, and other miscellaneous items. Important to note here 
is that actual offset transactions deal with the fulfillment of agreements made in previous 
. . . 
years. Therefore, the great majority of the offset transactions illustrated in Table 3 are not 
connected with the new offset obligations shown in Table 1 and Figure 2. Table 3 
illustrates that total offset transactions had a slight increase of approximately 2 percent 
from 1993 to 1994 and then a substantial increase of 38 percent from 1994 to 1995. 
Many categorie's experienced significant fluctuations throughout the 1993-1995 period. 
This is primarily due to three reasons: 1) there were relatively few transactions in 1994, 
so a single large contract greatly impacted the values for that year; 2) the steady attrition 
of transactions on completed older agreements; and 3) an increase in new offset 
transactions. Figure 3 arid Table' 3 illustrate that both new offset obligations and the 
actual offset transactions executed to fulfill existing obligations are showing an 
increasing trend for the period 1993-1995. This increasing trend can be explained by 




Total Offset Transactions by Type, 1993-1995 
Actual Transaction Valoes, in $OOOs 
1993 1994 1995 1993·1995 
Offset Type Value % of Total Value % of Total Value % of Total Grand Total % of Total 
Purchase 665,839 35.1% 601,701 31.1% 818,813 30.6% 2,086,353 32.1% 
Subcontractor 375,919 19.8% 360,323 18.6% 824,011 30.8% 1,560,253 24.0% Activity 
Credit 278,221 14.7% 3,494 0.2% 374,248 14.0% 862,800 13.3% Transfer 
Technology 183,307 9.7% 462,569 23.9% 216,924 8.1% 655,962 10.1% Transfer 
Other 119,840 6.3% 149,602 7.7% 127,881 4.8% 397,323 6.1% 
Training 167,994 8.8% 107,912 5.6% 104,645 3.9% 380,552 5.9% 
Investment 34,358 1.8% 92,405 4.8% 117,152 4.4% 243,915 3.8% 
Co-production 35,550 1.9% 111,895 5.8% 85,887 3.2% 233,332 3.6% 
Lie. Prod. 37,851 2.0% 45,424 2.3% 5,110 0.2% 88,385 1.4% Assembly 
Total 1,898,880 100% 1,935,325 100% 2,674,671 100% 6,508,875 100% 
Table 3. Total Offset Transactions by Type, 1993-1995. 
a. Growth in Offset Demand 
The increasing trend in total offset growth is the result of increases in both· 
. . 
the number of countries demanding offsets and the growing offset obligation level that 
countries are demanding when negotiating a sale. Most foreign countries now require 
offsets as a matter of policy. Additionally, many countries see the use of offsets as a tool 
in pursuing .their own industrial policies. Via various offsets, purchasing countries can 
acquire new technology, maintain domestic employment, create their own national 
industrial base, and also acquire new, markets for their own goods. (GAO, 1996) 
Some arms purchasers also daim that trade restrictions imposed by the 
United States and other arms-producing countries necessitate the establishment of offset 
policies in order to ensure that their own defense industries are given an equal 
opportunity to compete. While the United States does not require offset requirements for 
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its own military purchases it does have policies that favor domestic production. For 
example, the Defense Production Act of 1950 allows the Secretary of Defense to preserve 
portions of the domestic military industrial base by restricting purchases of critical items 
from foreign sources. Regulations implemented by the Buy America Act of 1993 allow 
price preferences for domestic manufacturers. Annual DoD appropriation acts sometimes 
contain certain prohibitions on foreign purchases of specific products. In response to 
some of these obstacles to free trade, offsets are used as a means to maintain a country's 
own industrial health. (GAO, 1996) 
Therefore, both the increase in the quantity of arms-purchasing countries 
requiring offsets and the increase in offset obligations demanded by these countries has 
contributed to the increase in total offsets. This can be expected to continue as long as 
foreign purchasers see the use of offsets as both a tool to bolster their own economy and 
as a protectionary device used to shield their own defense businesses from perceived 
unfair competition 
b.· Increase in Offset Transactions 
Another trend shown by current data is that actual offset transactions are 
also increasing. That is, U.S. industry'S spending to fulfill agreements made in previous 
years continues to rise. Whereas countries used to allow companies to meet offset 
obligations with a one-time purchase of a country's goods or a one-time investment, there 
is now a greater emphasis on longer term projects anq commitments~ This can be 
expected to continue. Foreign countries are now beginning to view offset deals and 
commitments as not only beneficial for a particular sale but also as a long-term strategy 
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through which they can bolster their own economy. Thus, they will require both offsets 
that are of higher value and longer term. (GAO, 1996) 
2. Direct vs. Indirect Offset Growth 
a. Direct Offset Growth 
Table 4 shows that direct offsets were $582.4 million in 1993, rose to 
almost $600 million in 1994, and then increased sharply to nearly $1.1 billion ~n 1995, 
growing al~ost 83 percent during the 1993-1995 review period. As a percentage of total 
actual offset values, direct offsets were 33 percent in 1993, 34 percent in 1994, and 
almost 40 percent in 1995. The percentage increase of direct offsets in 1995 is 
attributable in part to corrections to the categorizations of certain reported transactions. 
The 1995 table includes the "purchase" transactions solely as indirect offsets and the 
"sub-contractor" activity" solely as direct offsets. The "licensed production" and "co-
production" transaction· types are also categorized solely as direct offsets. These 
groupings were divided between direct and indirect offsets in the 1993 and 1994 data 
because of apparent mislabeling in the survey responses. If offset activities had been 
properly categorized each· year; there may have not been such a dramatic increase from 
1994 to 1995. Table 5 shows the ratio of direct offset to total offset transactions. Figure 
4 shows this relationship graphically. Historically, direct offsets comprise approximately 
40 percent of total offset transactions. 
, . 
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Dire.ct Offset Transactions by Type, 1993-1995 
Actual Transaction Values, in $OOOs 
1993 1994 1995 1993-1995 
Offset Type Value % of Total Value % of Total Value % of Total Grand Total % of Total 
Purchase 104,694 18.0% 93,003 15.5% 0 0.0% 197,697 8.8% 
Subcontractor 178,570 30.7% 146,139 24.4% 824,011 77.4% 1,148,720 51.1% Activity 
Credit 0 0.0% 494 0.1% 3,511 0.3% 4,005 0.2% Transfer 
Technology 64,943 11.2% 114,494 19.1% 110,120 10.4% 289,557 12.9% Transfer 
Other 164,372 28.2% 50,913 8.5% 23,618 2.2% 238,903 10.6% 
Training 9,588 1.7% 46,602 7.8% 11,871 1.1% 68,061 3.0% 
Investment 25,834 4.4% 33,302 5.6% 5,110 0.5% 64,246 2.9% 
Co-production 34,435 5.9%. 111,170 18.5% 85,887 8.1% 231,492 10.3% 
Lic. Prod. 0 . 0.0% 3,850 0.6% 0 0.0% 3,850 0.2% Assembly 
Total 582,437 100% 599,967 100% 1,064,128 100% 2,246,532 100% 
Table 4. Direct Offset Transactions by Type, 1993-1995. 
h. Indirect Offset Growth 
Table 6 presents the indirect offset figures for the 1993-1995 period. 
These statistics show that the dollar value of actual indirect offsets rose from just under 
$1.2 billion in 1993 to about $1.6 billion in 1995, an increase of 35 percent. As 
mentioned earlier, the 1995 data is somewhat altered from that collected for 1993 and 
1994 because reported purchase transactions are shown as indirect offsets only. Table 7 
shows the ratio of indirect offsets to total offset transactions. . Figure 5 shows this 
relationship graphically. Indirect offset transactions comprise the the majority of all 
offset transactions, maintaining a consistent level of approximately 60 percent. 
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Direct Offset Transactions: Selected Years 
(in billions) 
Year Total Offset Trans. I Direct Offset Trans. I Direct Offset % 
1980 0.9 0.1 11.1% 
1981 1 0.3 30.0% 
1982 0.9 0.4 44.4% 
1983 1.3 0.4 30.8% 
1984 1.8 0.7 38.9% 
1985 2.1 0.8 38.1% 
1986 3 0.9 30.0% 
1987 3.6 1 27.8% 
1988 * * * 
1989 * * * 
1990 * * * 
1991 * * * 
1992 * * * 
1993 1.9 0.6 31.6% 
1994 1.9 0.6 31.6% 
1995 2.7 1.1 40.7% 
*No data collected 
Table 5. Direct Offset Transactions: Selected Years. 
PERCENTAGE OF DIR~CT OFFSETS TO 
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Figure 4. Percentage of Direct Offsets to Total Offset Transactions. 
c. Analysis of Direct vs. Indirect Offset Growth 
Despite some of the wide fluctuations in total offset obligations, how these 
obligations are fimilly executed maintains a consistent pattern - indirect offsets comprise 
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the majority of payment means. The ratio between direct and indirect offsets consistently 
remains at approximately 60/40. 
The types of offsets required by buyer countries depend upon their offset 
program goals which, in tum, are driven by their industrial and economic development 
needs. Generally, countries with established defense industries (for example, Canada and 
Indirect Offset Transactions by Type, 1993-1995 
Actual Transaction Values, in $OOOs 
1993 1994 1995 1993-1995 
Offset Type Value % of Total Value % of Total Value % of Total Grand Total % of Total 
Purchase 518,045 43.5% 462,110 . 39.3% 818,813 50.8% 1,798,968 45.3% 
Subcontractor 179,348 15.1% 204,159 17.4% 0 0.0% 383,507 9.6% Activity . 
Credit 278,221 23.3% 3,000 0.3% 370,737 23.0% 651,958 16.4% Transfer 
Technology 91,131 7.7% 285,075 24.3% 106,804 6.6% 483,010 12.2% Transfer 
Other 3,622 0.3% 56,999 4.9% 81,027 5.0% 141,648 3.6% 
Training 110,252 9.3% 103,000 8.8% 116;010 7.2% 329,262 8.3% 
Investment 0 0.0% 105 0.0% 0 0.0% 105 0.0% 
Co-production 0 0.0% 725 0.1% 0 0.0% 725 0.0% 
Lic. Prod. 9;758 0.8% 59,255 5.0% 117,152 7.3% 186,165 4.7% Assembly 
Total 1,190,378 100% 1,174,428 100% 1,610,543 100% 3,975,349 100% 
Table 6. Indirect Offset Transactions by Type, 1993-1995. 
the United Kingdom) are using offsets to help channel work to their defense or aerospace 
companies. Often these offsets are related to the weapon system being acquired (i.e., 
direct offsets) but may also involve unrelated defense projects. Countries with 
) 
developing defense and commercial industries (for example, South Korea or Taiwan) 
pursue both defense and. non-defense related offsets that emphasize the transfer of high 
technology in either defense or comparable high technology industries. Countries with 
less industrialized economies (for example, Kuwait or Saudi Arabia) often pursue· indirect 
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offsets as a method, of fostering foreign investment, creating viable commercial 
businesses, or building the country's infrastructure. Direct offsets are not usually pursued 
because these countries have limited defense and other advanced technology industries.. 
(GAO,1996) 
Indirect offsets can be expected to maintain the majority share of total 
offsets obligations and transactions. More countries with less developed economies and 
defense industrial infrastructures are purchasing weapons systems from United States' 
defense firms. For these 'countries, indirect offsets are more useful to their economic and 
industrial goals than direct offsets. Indirect offsets are seen as both a method by which 
they can reduce the total cost of a purchase and also a tool via which they can help spur 
growth in non-defense rel~ted sectors of their economy. While nations possessing a more 
mature defense industrial base may desire more direct offsets, they also see the 
advantages that indirect offsets can give to their economy. All arms purchasers can 
utilize the benefits of indirect offsets while direct offsets are useful to only a fraction of 
this group. 
C. ASSESSING THE IMPACTS OF OFFSETS 
As noted above, the DoC reports on offsets did not contain analyses on the impact 
that offsets have on U.S. employment, labor, and trade. This is significant in that one of 
the primary purposes of this report, as mandated by Section 309 of the Defense 
Production Act of 1950, as amended, is to track how offsets affect these areas, of the U.S. 
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Indirect Offset Transactions: Selected Years 
(in billions) 
Year Total Offset Trans. I Indirect Offset Trans. I Indirect Offset % 
1980 0.9 0.8 88.9% 
1981 1 0.7 70.0% 
1982 0.9 0.5 55.6% 
1983 1.3 0.9 69.2% 
1984 1.8 1.1 61.1% 
1985 2.1 1.3 61.9% 
1986 3 1.4 46.7% 
1987 3.6 2.3 63.9% 
1988 * * * 
1989 * * * 
1990 * *. * 
1991 * * *. 
1992 * * * 
.. 
1993 1.9 1.2 63.2% 
1994 1.9 1.2 63.2% 
1995 2.7 1.6 59.3% 




Table 7. Indirect Offset Transactions: Selected Years. 
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Figure 5. Indirect Offsets as Compared to Total Offset Transactions. 
industrial base. DoC does not conduct analyses similar to OM13 because of inherent 
flaws in both the data collection and methodology OMB utilized. Additionally, OMB did 
not release the raw forms of their data taken from 1980-1987 to DoC, preventing DoC 
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from maintaining a historical database through which it could track any types of long. 
term trends. As a result of the methodology errors dicussed below, DoC did not concur 
with OMB' s 1990 prior to its release. When responsibility for completing this annual 
report was transferred from OMB to DoC in 1992, the U.S. Congress waived the 
requirement that the report address the specific issues of offset impact on employment, 
labor, and trade (DOC, 1998). However, considering both the public and Congressional 
attention this practice receives, it would be beneficial to quantify its effects on the U.S. 
industrial base. The following paragraphs will both explain the specific flaws of OMB' s 
analysis and methods through which in-depth studies of offset impacts may be conducted 
in the future. 
1. Methodology Errors 
When deriving offset impacts on employment, OMB relied upon prime 
contractors' estimates of the employment effects of particular sales. The questionnaires 
prime contractors completed for the survey asked only for estimated direct employment 
effects within their facilities. It did not ask these industries to estimate any indirect 
effects offsets may have caused on their employment. Secondary and lower tier 
subcontractors were not solicited for this analysis. All of OMB' s estimates were 
dependent upon the prime contractors supplying accurate employment data. However, it 
had to be assumed that the employment data submitted by prime contractors would be 
presented in a light favorable for their own purposes.. When attempting to derive 
estimates on indirect employment effects, the accuracy of the data received from the 
primes once again affected results. 
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After collecting employment data, OMB used an Input-Output (1-0) table with 
the aid of output labor ratios. An 1-0 table is an economic analysis technique developed 
by Wassily Leontief in the early 1930's which identifies and quantifies the interactions 
between various sectors of the economy (either a regional, national, or global economy). 
1-0 . analysis also shows the patterns of interindustry linkages and the relationships 
between final demand sectors and payment sectors (1. Walter, 1998). This enables 
researchers to examine the impacts of external shocks, policy measures, or large projects 
on an economy (for a further explanation on 1-0 tables, see Appendix A). The 1-0 table 
used in the OMB study, however, was out of date and ignored relationships· between 
employment and 1) relative price changes over time; 2) response to technological change; 
and 3)economies of scale. Despite these weaknesses in both the data collection and 
analysis tools, OMB arrived at the conclusions discussed earlier in this chapter. OMB 
acknowledged some of the shortcomings in their analysis, but stated that their results 
would not significantly change if they re-contacted the companies and had them re-
estimate the data using some sort of consistent methodology. (OMB,1990) 
When estimating the effect of offsets with. regards to the trade position of the 
U.S., two of the primary questions OMB attempted to answer were: (1) In which 
industrial sectors have countries received offset obligations as a result of purchasing from 
u.s. defense firms and; (2) What U.S. sectors are most affected by these exports and 
offsets? The design of this particular analysis, however, had to take into account two 
substantial unknowns in the survey data. First, at the time offset agreements were made, 
companies often did not know the product sectors in which the·concessions would occur, 
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especially in the area of indirect offsets. While this inconsistency primarily affected data 
on offset commitments, it also materialized to some extent in data on actual transactions. 
Second, even where the product sectors involved in the. implementation of offset 
commitments were known, trade consequences were sometimes difficult or impossible to 
interpret if the specific products involved were unknown (for example, what specific 
products would be involved in a countertrade arrangement) or if the offsets were of a type 
where trade consequences were ambiguous (for example, investment or technology 
transfer). Although OMB was able to make a general assessment on how offsets effected 
trade, its conclusions are partly overshadowed by the questionable validity of their data. 
(OMB,1990) 
OMB's 1990 report concluded that, in the area of industrial competitiveness, 
offsets played a virtually negligible role in the output of u.S. defense related industries 
and that in only five of these industrial sectors were the impacts measurable. However,.in 
arriving at this conclusion, OMB assumed that billings for military exports always 
resulted in demand increases that were met by increased output of a U.S. based industry. 
This may not always be the case, especially if the output associated ~ith a given billing 
takes place offshore (for example, in a contractor's factory that may be overseas). This 
tended to overestimate slightly the positive effects of offsets on industrial output. 
However, the minimal effect offsets had on cumulative industrial competitiveness tends 
to minimize this effect 
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2. Improvements to the OMB Methodology 
a. Data Collection 
In order to detennine the true extent of any positive or negative effects, 
both prime contractors and subcontractors in defense related industries should be solicited 
to submit employment and trade data when they are involved or effected, directly or 
indirectly, by offset agreements and transactions. Additionally, to ensure that submitted 
data is accurate, verification of a company's data (regardless of whether it indicates a 
positive or negative trend) should be required. This verification would consist of both the 
specific offset agreement that· effected the firm and how the offset effected the 
employment and output of the company. Finally, if reforms were made in the data 
collection and methodology of an offset study, it would have to be conducted over a 
period of several years before any conclusions could be reached. Since offsets are . 
increasingly being implemented over a longer period of time as foreign countries utilize 
them as a long-term economic strategy, the full impact of an offset on a particular 
industry would be ambiguous until long term trends could be established. A lengthy 
study would require both patience and diligence from industry and U.S. Government. 
agencies in both the collection and analysis of data. 
b. Scope 
The scope of the survey would also have to be limited in order to ensure 
accurate results.. The accuracy of .any analysis is directly related to the ~curacy of the 
data being collected. In the OMB survey, attempts were made to measure the impacts of 
indirect offsets using estimation methods based off of industry estimated employment 
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data. The results of an estimation of other estimates will not provide a high degree of 
accuracy. The data collected needs to be of a nature where it can be accurately measured. 
The specific types .and amounts of any indirect offset are rarely known when an offset 
agreement is made. Therefore, it is extremely difficult to determine exactly what sector 
of the U.S. economy these indirect offsets will effect and to what degree they will do so 
(that is, the quantitative amount that the indirect offset will effect employment, output, 
and trade quantities). In order to arri,:e at more accurate results that are less susceptible 
to these uncertainties, only direct offsets should be measured in order to assess the effect 
on U.S. labor, trade, and competitiveness. It is far easier to measure accurately direct 
offsets since they are agreed to at the time of sale and because these effects are all 
traceable to the sale of a specific weapons system. In other words, there is a direct 
correlation between the sale of a U.s. weapons system and the labor and economic 
consequences its associated direct offsets cause. Although this assessment method would 
be incomplete because it would not include indirect offset effects, the impacts of direct 
offsets could be well established, hopefully shedding ~ight on the overall effects of total 
offsets on the industrial base. 
D. SUMMARY 
This chapter has discussed and analyzed the current trends in overall, direct, and 
indirect offset growth. While the monetary amounts of total offset obligations have 
fluctuated, their value has. consistently exceeded 40 percent of total export contracts every 
year except one since 1980. Data from 1993-1995 reveal an increasing trend in offset 
obligations. This data also shows that offsets are a significant portion of overall defense 
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export contracts and there is no evidence to suggest that offsets will decrease significantly 
in the near future. In fact, foreign purchasers now view offsets as a long-term strategy 
through which they can strengthen their own economy and the use of offsets as an 
economic tool is expected to continue. While total offset obligations have been subject to 
a wide degree of variability, the proportion of direct and indirect offset transactions has 
remained fairly stable (approximately a 40/60 split). The popularity and protracted use of 
. indirect offsets can be expected to continue since many of U.S. industry's foreign 
. . . 
customers are not solely intent on bllilding their domestic defense industries. Depending 
on a country's level of economic development and long term economic goals, they may 
prefer to use indirect offsets to strengthen the non-defense sectors of their economy_ 
The results of the OMB's·1990 survey on offsets were explained as were the 
inaccuracies in their data collection and methodology. Because of these inaccuracies, the 
difficulty in tracking the effects of offsets on subcontractors, and the absence of a reliable 
model through which to measure the quantitative effects of indirect offsets on the entire 
U.S. economy, DoC has not been required to provide a specific analysis on the impacts of 
offsets on employment, trade, and competition within the U.S. industrial base. However, 
improving data collection methods and narrowing the scope of the analysis may provide a 
more accurate assessment of the impacts of this trade practice. Although no analytical 
assessment has been recently completed to measure the impact of offsets on overall U.S. 
employment, trade, and ~ndustrial· competition, recently completed indu.stry surveys by 
both the Bureau of Export Analysis and the author, as documented in the next chapter, do 
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reveal how offsets can both positively and negatively impact industry. Both industrial 
impacts and industry reactions to the use of offsets will be examined in Chapter IV. 
• I 
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IV. INDUSTRIAL REACTIONS TO OFFSET GROWTH 
A. BACKGROUND 
The Bureau of Export Administration (BXA) conducted a survey of 
subcontractors to accompany both the 1996 and 1997 report on Offsets in Defense Trade. 
The Competitive Enhancement and Diversification Needs Assessment Survey was a 
voluntary survey directed towards small- and medium-sized businesses (less than 500 
employees) who were subcontractors of major defense prime contractors. The survey's 
purpose was to gather basic information about the subcontractors' operations, including 
sales, employment, and exports. Collected over a period of three years ending in April, 
1997, the BXA received responses from a total of 1,804 small- to medium-sized 
companies. The survey included the following questions about offsets and their impact 
on subcontractors: 
• Has your firm been involved in an offset agreement? 
• Has your firm been negatively affected by offset agreement practices? (For 
example: have you ever lost a sale because of an offset agreement, or have 
new competitors been created due to offset agreements?)" " 
• Has your firm been positively affected by offset agreements? 
The first question regarding offsets invQlvement was not restricted to only meaning that 
the firm participated in the formulation of offset agreements with an arms purchaser. It 
could also be interpreted as meaning that the firm was involved at arms length without 
any real control over the terms of the agreement. (DoC, 1997) 
53 
To augment this data, the author conducted personal interviews with 
representatives from 11 different sized firms during July and August of 1998. Four of 
these firms (The Boeing Company, Bell-Textron, United Defense, and Hughes Missile 
Systems) were very large, all in excess of 30,000 employees and were involved in the 
aerospace, helicopter, ground vehicle, and missile sectors of the defense industry. 
Additionally, representatives from seven small- to medium-sized businesses (less than 
500 employees) were also interviewed regarding their company's exposure to offsets. 
These companies (Quantic Industries, Aero-Gear Incorporated, American Precision 
Industries, Dynamic Controls Corporation, Aero-Tech Support Systems, B&E Tool 
Company, and Luminescent Systems Incorporated) were involved in a variety of business 
areas, including ordnance, aviation engine components, luminescent lighting 
manufacture, electrical connectors, and aerospace gears manufacturers. The questions for 
these interviews included those from the BXA survey and the following additional 
questions: 
• . Is 'any type of legislation/regulation needed to control the use of offsets? How 
would your firm be affected by this control? 
• If no changes are made in how the defense industry utilize offsets, what could 
be the long-term consequences for your company? 
• Any additional comments. 
This chapter will present both the results of BXA's survey and also some of the 
highlights of the author's interviews with industry (at the request of the firms 
interviewed, none of their spokespersons will be identified). A more in-depth summary 
of the interviews is contained in Appendix B. Based on these results, trends will be noted 
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on how offsets are impacting defense industry firms in the areas of employment, trade, 
and competitiveness. Finally, this chapter will conclude with descriptions of how offsets 
have affected two specific sectors of the defense industry: the machine tool industry and . 
the aerospace gear industry. 
B. BXA SURVEY RESULTS 
The results of the 1996 BXA study were taken from a sample of 1,151 small- to 
medium-sized companies that respon~ed to the survey. Of these companies, 987 
indicated some sort of involvement in offset agreements with 148 of these directly 
involved in the formulation of the offset agreement. Two hundred and two companies 
(20 percent of the companies who reported any degree of involvement in offsets) reported 
being impacted either positively or negatively by offsets. One hundred and sixty-eight 
(17 percent) of these companies reported that offsets effected them negatively while 34 
(3.4 percent) indicated that offsets effected them positively. When discussing the 
negative or positive effects of offsets, negative effects include those that result in 
decreased work orders, sales, and competitiveness for the firm. Many of the firms also 
r~ported that they would have to reduce their workforce as a result of these negative 
effects. Positive effects included an increase in work orders, sales, and increased access 
to new markets. 
In 1997 an additional 703 surveys were received by the BXA. Six hundred and 
fifty-nine companies (94 percent of the 1997 survey population) indicated some degree ~f 
involvement in forming the offset agreement. One hundred and fourteen companies in 
the 1996 survey reported that their businesses were impacted by offsets, 25 positively and 
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89 adversely. Table 8 presents the overall categorical summary of responses to both the 
1996 and 1997 surveys (percentages in the right columns are based on the total responses 
to the offset questions). (DoC, 1997) . 
BXA Needs Assessment Surve 
BXA's survey also used company data in order to evaluate trends with respect to 
defense sales as a portion of total revenue. This information was calculated based on 
fIrms t~at reported defense business. This included 967 companies out of the 987 that 
responded to the 1996 survey and 512 companies out of the 659 responses received in 
1997. The average defense business share of the population was 36.7 percent in 1996 and 
32.9 percent in 1997. Those companies reporting a negative offset impact had an average 
defense share of business of 50.1 percent in 1996 while in 1997 the companies reporting a 
negative offset impact averaged 43.4 percent defense shares, a decrease of 6.7 'percent. 
Companies reporting positive impacts had their defense ,shares drop from 57.3 percent in 
1996 to 45.9 percent in 1997, a decrease of 11.4 percent. This data reflects a trend that 
smaller businesses, on average, have experienced a reduction in defense generated 
revenues and business over the two-year period ,(DoC, 1997). While BXA's survey was 
inconclusive as to the exact nature of this decrease in defense-related business (whether 
que to downsizing, fewer U.S. Government contracts, or an increase in Government 
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orders going overseas due to offsets), it can be concluded that small- and medium-sized 
businesses will face increased competition to obtain defense contracts in a smaller 
defense-related market. Therefore, any future adverse economic effects due to offset 
practices will have increasingly negative impacts for these businesses. Additionally, the 
percentage of defense revenues for those companies involved in offset agreements 
showed a slight increase, indicating that firms with greater defense shares are more likely 
to be involved or impacted by offsets. This may reflect a trend that companies will have 
to become increasingly involved in offset agreements as a matter of practice if they want 
to ensure that a large portion of their revenues come· from the defense sector. Table 9 
summarizes this data. 
Relationships of Offsets to Defense Sales 
Number of Firms % Defense Revenues 
Offset Response CateQorv '1996 1997 1996 19~7 
Total Population Reporting Defense Sales 967 512 36.70% 32.90% 
Negative Impact 160 83 50.10% 43.40% 
Positive Impact 33 22 57.30% 45.90% 
Involvement 143 42 48.40% 49.60% 
Table 9. Relationships of Offsets to Defense Sales. 
Table 10 shows the data used to derive the relationship of offsets to employment. 
Average employment for the total population of firms responding to the BXA survey was 
105 in 1996 and 80 for 1997. As can be seen by comparing the employment figures for 
positively impacted and negatively impacted firms in both 1996 and 1997, positively 
impacted firms are much larger in terms of average employment than negatively impacted 
firms. This may indicate that smaller firms are more susceptible and, therefore, more 
likely to be negatively impacted by offsets than larger firms. However, it may also mean 
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that larger firms have other business, more oversight, greater influence over the design 
and implementation of the offset, or that prime contractors recognize the larger firms as 
critical first tier subcontractors and, not wishing to jeopardize this relationship, design the 
offset to be less harmful to larger subcontractors. (DoC, 1997) 
Relationship of Offsets to Employment 
Number of Firms Avg. Employ~es 
Offset Response CateQory 1996 1997 1996 1997 
Total Population Reporting Employment 967 636 105 80 
Negative Impact 164 85 165 93 
Positive Impact 33 23 274 156 
Involvement 145 42 242 237 
Table 10. Relationships of Offsets to Employment. 
The results of BXA's survey tend to support the hypothesis that companies with 
larger defense markets and more employees are more likely to be involved directly and 
impacted by offsets~. This could appear to mean that offsets generally impact larger . 
subcontractor firms more than smaller ones. If this is indeed the case, there may be 
several explanations as to why smaller firms would be less impacted: 
1) Smaller firms may have a degree of immunity. For example, the scale 
of their operations would make offsetting less efficient, and thus less 
desirable. . 
2) Smaller firms may not recognize the impact. Communications beyond 
their immediate customer (the prime or a higher level sub-contractor) 
may be poor or non-existent. 
3) Smaller firms are versatile and offsets 'do not matter. Offsets are 
irrelevant to their success; business opportunities are available 
elsewhere. (DoC, 1997) 
Of the four prime defense contractors interviewed, all of them indicated major 
involvement in the design and implementation of offsets. None of them indicated great 
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enthusiasm for this marketing tool and, in fact, would rather prefer to do what they do 
best - produce their particular product - and get paid in cash. However, they admitted 
that establishing and implementing offset agreements was a business practice they had to 
do in order to stay competitive. All of them indicated that offsets were beneficial for their 
companies in that they enabled them to conduct business in the international market. Of 
the seven smaller defense subcontractors interviewed, two stated that their companies 
were directly involved in some type of offset arrangement while five acknowledged that 
their business was being impacted by offsets. Six of these smaller companies were being 
negatively impacted (loss of orders, market share, or adverse employment effects) by 
offsets while one of the companies stated that offset agreements had positively effected 
business (an overseas market had opened up for their product). 
c." OFFSET IMPACT ON EMPLOYMENT 
1. Large Firms 
Large firms (defined as firms with more than 500 employees although the large 
firms referred to in this thesis had more than 30,000 employees) acknowledge that offsets 
will inevitably transfer some jobs overseas which otherwise would haye been performed 
in the United States. However, they argue that offsets help preserve American jobs since 
without the offsets, the sale itself could have" very likely gone to an overseas producer, 
resulting in no work creation in the U.S. Not only do they create some U.S. jobs, they can 
also extend production tuns resulting in longer-term employment fot U.S. workers (GAO, 
1996). By sacrificing some U.S. jobs they were able to retain others. (Johnson, 1987). 
For example, in 1992 McDonnell Douglas claimed that if 72 F-15E militaryaircrafi were 
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not sold to Saudi Arabia, 40,000 jobs would be lost due to shut down production lines . 
and the loss of other general support jobs. The aircraft finn used this argument to help 
them gain Congressional approval for the sale (FAS, 1994). It must be noted, however, 
that overseas sales facilitated by offsets can lead to the creation of export-related 
American jobs including maintenance of defense system production lines, the 
manufacture of additional spares, and the p.roviding of services over the lifetime of the 
exported hardware. Conversely, potential exists for offsets to lead to the loss of domestic 
jobs via uneconomic coproduction or licensed production agreements resulting in 
manufacturing perfonned overseas (DoC, 1996). As one interviewed large business 
spokesman said, "Our company does not like sending some of these jobs away from U.S. 
workers but what is the alternative? Without some of these offset agreements, there may 
be no work at all".(Bell-Textron Spokesman, 1998). 
2. Medium and Small Firms 
In contrast to the position of large finns, medium and small finns overwhelmingly 
argue that the use of offsets has adversely affected domestic employment. They argue 
that the large defense contractors who make the offset agreements do not feel the brunt of 
the agreement's consequences. Large defense companies will not agree to offset 
provisions that leave them worse off than they were prior to the agreement. Oftentimes, 
the lower tier subcontractors are on the receiving end of the offset agreements in the 
fonns of lost business. These smaller companies claim that offset agreements transfer 
subcontracting work to overseas finns, result in co-production agreements that reduce the 
domestic demand for jobs, and require American prime contractors to source parts from . 
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overseas (DoC, 1997). As one medium-sized business spokesman said, "Offsets have 
taken work out of our shop and put it into other countries around the world" (Aero-Gear, 
Inc. Spokesman, 1998) Of the seven small- to medium-sized businesses interviewed, six 
stated that they had experienced reductions in employment in the last five years. While 
not all of these reductions were solely due to offsets, the ~ompanies reported that 
increased use of offsets at either their level or the prime contractor level had adversely 
effected their market share and, thus, their employment. There are also long-term 
employment effects from offsets; As foreign countries reap the advantages of various 
offsets such as technology transfer and co-production and develop their own domestic 
manufacturing capability, the creation of overseas competitors will have long term effects 
on U.S. employment opportunities. One small business stated that offsets are effecting 
current job opportunities, "Offshore competitors have literally been put into business to . 
compete against us." He continued, "Offsets typically create competitors in a prospective 
market, obstructing future business into the region" (B&E Tool Company Spokesman, 
1998). Not only are offsets adversely affecting current defense industry employment, 
they may also ~ffect future employment since entry into potential markets may be more' 
difficult. Additionally, offsets can adversely effect the employment in non-defense 
related industries who lose business because of indirect offsets (FAS, 1994). 
D. OFFSET IMPACT ON TRADE 
1~ Large Firms 
Large firms contend that offsets benefit the U.S. balance of trade since they enable 
U.S. defense companies to make sales to foreign purchasers and export their products. 
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They also argue that if they were restricted from offering offsets to potential purchasers, 
customers could simply find another firm to do business with, adversely effecting the 
u.s. trade balance if these customers went to an overseas business. As one company' 
spokesman said in a recent interview, "We're worried about potential customers going 
somewhere else for a product. Sixty percent of something is better than 0 percent of 
nothing" (Boeing Spokesman, 1998). Additionally, they argue that for every export, at 
some time and place there must be an ,import of equal value. Thus, over time the U.S. 
will gain back any trade that it loses as a result of offsets (Johnson, 1988). Offset 
opponents have also claimed that technology transferred as a result of offset agreements 
could be used by the recipient country not only in the immediate undertaking but 
ultimately to produce products that will compete with similar U.S. products in the world 
economy, potentially eroding the America's trade balance even further. Large firms 
contend that this is not a major problem: 
As already noted, companies are very, aware of the importance of 
maintaining a technological edge over the competition. The best way to 
do that is not through guarding current technology, but by always having 
new and better technologies . under development. By the time the 
technology is made available through an offset and actually employed 
overseas, the U.S. firm is almost certain to .be incorporating even newer 
technology in its own production processes. (Johnson, 1988) 
Thus, large firms contend that the best way for U.S. businesses to defend their trade 
position is to constantly develop better products and foster a global demand for them. 
2. Medium and Small Firms 
Medium and small firms overwhelmingly agree that the use of offsets has had an 
adverse effect on their domestic and international trade. One small business spokesman 
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told the author, "Offset agreements have cost my company millions in lost revenue" 
(Aero-Tech Support Systems Spokesman, 1998). Not only have prime U.S. defense 
contractors switched to overseas vendors for manufacture, of various parts of a weapons 
system, these new foreign products are increasingly replacing American made products. 
One U.S. subcontractor stated, "In a couple of Pacific Rim areas, competitors have 
established offset agreements to eliminate the sale of our product" (Aero-Gear, Inc. 
Spokesman, 1998)., Of the seven small- to medium-sized businesses interviewed for this 
thesis, six reported that offsets were partly responsible for reduced orders for their 
products. One medium sized firm did report that the implementation of an offset 
agreement had actually exposed his product to international markets (Luminescent 
Systems, Inc. Spokesman, 1998). In some circumstances, the present facilitation of offset 
agreements could pose future, threats to the American balance of trade. For example, 
Spain bid for a new main battle tailk to be built in Spain so that it could export it in direct 
competition to the American supplier (Neuman, 1986). Perhaps the most insidious of 
indirect offset types that threaten America's trade balance is that of countertrade. In this 
situation, contractors will 'assist a country in finding markets for its exports, some of 
which will be in the United States. In this case, not only is the defense industry's balance 





E. OFFSET IMPACT ON COMPETITION 
1. Large Firms 
In today's markets, the United States has strong competitors for most U.S. 
products. In the defense arena, specifically, U.S. sales of defense equipment in the 
international markets has declined due to reductions in arms p1l:rchases both within the 
U.S. and abroad. Additionally, new amis suppliers have emerged in the marketplace. 
Other arms producers such as Israel and Brazil have joined traditional competitors such as 
the former Soviet Union and France. Faced with this environment, the use of offsets is 
critical for the health of the U.S. defense industry. Mr. Joel Johnson, Vice President of 
the American League for Exports and Security Assistance, said, "From the perspective of 
the U.S. prime defense contractors, in light of the current competitive international 
environment there is the chdice between business with' offsets or no business at all" 
(Johnson, 1988). From a seller's point of view, offsets are a way of staying competitive 
in order to maintain market share or improve sales. In 1994, for example, two American 
arms manufacturing giants - McDonnell Douglas and Lockheed - were in fierce 
, competition for, a $2 billion dollar sale of combat aircraft to Israel. Each was' trying to ' 
outbid the other in terms of price, technology, and offset packages. McDonnell Douglas 
eventually won the contract but only after agreeing to an offset package that will benefit 
Israeli industry for up to 100 percent of the sale's value (FAS, 1994). Without this offset 
package, 'McDonnell Douglas would have lost the competition. One contractor told the 
author that, " .. .it is our policy not to solicit offsets. Rather, we will only agree to an 
offset arrangement if we are convinced that we have no other choice if we want to stay 
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competitive" (Boeing Spokesman, 1998). Of the four large contractors interviewed for 
this thesis, all four felt that offsets were a vital tool for them in order to stay competitive 
in the international arms market. 
2. Medium and Small Firms 
Medium and small fIrms believe that they have become less competitive in the 
market because of offsets. Offset agreements not only may obligate prime contractors to 
source labor and parts overseas, but also may assist foreign . industries in their own 
development and enable them to compete against small and medium sized American 
fIrms both in international and U.S. markets. For example, technology transfer may 
potentially create foreign competitors who may then use this technology to block future 
component exports into their market or to enter U.S. markets. Additionally, a foreign 
competitor may be subsidized by its government, a common practice in many foreign 
markets. These factors can potentially place U.S. subcontractors at a competitive 
disadvantage. One contractor admitted, " ... we were best in price and technical proposal 
but the (prime contractor) had to place contract in country where sales of new aircraft 
demanded that work load. on that aircraft be placed in that country" (Dynamic Controls 
Corporation Spokesman, 1998) Another interviewed subcontractor said, "Offshore 
competitors have literally been put into business to effectively compete against us" 
(Quantic Industries, Inc. Spokesman, 1998) 
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F. SECTOR BREAKOUTS 
1. The Effects of Offsets on the Machine Tool Industry 
Machine tools are one of the most essential products supporting modem advanced 
economies in terms of innovation and manufacturing productivity. Despite the industry's 
small size, nearly all other machines used in the economy are built either directly or 
indirectly by machine tools. The industry is global and specialized. For each major type 
of machine tool, often only a handful of producers compete for business on a global basis. 
(DoC, 1997) 
Until the 1980's, the U.S. machine tool industry was the world leader. However, 
this changed as Japanese, German, and other machine tool builders gained global market 
share, and captured large portions of the American market. The U.S. industry appears to 
have stabilized, although at a much lower level, in the 1990's. In 1995, the U.S. ranked 
fIrst among nations in the consumption of machine tools ($6.7 billion), but third in 
production ($4.5 billion). The U.S. machine tool deficit in 1995 was $2.25 billion. 
(DoC, 1997) 
Offsets' appear to have had an impact on the U.S. based production in the 
metalworking machine tool industry (specific machine tools effected included punching 
presses, wire cutting machines, automatic presses, various grinding machines, turret 
presses, and others). Based on the annual s.ales volume of the U.S. machine tool industry 
relative to the dollar value of offset transactions, the impact is seemingly small. In fact, 
the total dollar value of machine tool offsets for the three years 1993-1995 was $113 
million, which is less than one percent of U.S. production over this· time frame. 
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However, the impact of .offsets is not felt so much at the aggregate level as it is at the firm 
leveL (DoC, 1997) 
Offsets contribute to the large U.S. machine tool trade deficit by increasing· 
imports or reducing U.S. exports of machine tools. The $113 million in machine tool 
offset transactions were primarily fulfilled in Switzerland, Finland, and Malaysia. In 
1994-1995 alone, the U.S. machine tool trade deficit to Finland, a small producer ranked 
21st in the world, was $33 million. The deficit with Switzerland (fifth leading producer) 
was over $435 million. . The United States had a $36 million surplus In trade with 
Malaysia, but this could have been much larger had there not been two offset deals to 
Malaysia worth over $60 million. (DoC, 1997) 
When offsets are used to influence purchasing decisions, and thereby preempt 
normal market forces, the loss of business 'will negatively impact some other global 
competitor. Some U.S. machine tool firms are globally competitive; these tend to be 
larger, and their presence in global markets makes them more vulnerable to market 
distortions and imperfections. Many of the U.S. firms are small, family owned 
businesses. In fact, about three-quarters of domestic machine tool companies employ 
fewer than 50 people. These smaller companies supply parts and components to the 
larger machine tool builders, and also stand to lose business as a result of offsets. A 
corollary effect is that the offsets introduced some U.S. end-user firms to new potential 
foreign suppliers of machine tools~ relationships that will continue over ti~e as U.S. 
firms attempt to fulfill offset obligations as well as bank future offset credits. (DoC, 
1997) 
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This short case study illustrates that offset effects can be difficult to measure or 
even seem inconsequential at the macroeconomic level. However, when the scope of the 
analysis is reduced to analyzing the effects within a particular industrial sector some 
offset effects may be easier to identify. In the case of machine tools, offsets have had a 
direct impact on the position of U.S. machine tool manufacturers within the world 
market. Increasingly, machine tool transactions have been carried out overseas as a result 
of offset transactions, enabling foreign competitiors to increase their market share. 
Conversely, U.S. machine tool manufacturers and their suppliers, which tend to be small 
businesses, are losing their share of this market. 
2. The Effects of Offsets on the Aerospace Gear Industry. 
Gears are highly specialized items that are near the top of the spectrum in terms of 
mechanical complexity and manufacturing difficulty. This especially applies to aerospace 
gears, which are fabricated out of specialty metals to very tight· tolerances. Most gear 
elements and components are designed and manufactured for specific end products. 
Thousands of customized part numbers are in use, which are difficult to replicate without 
the design drawings. An integrated gearbox producer makes some of the gear elements 
in-house and buys others, and then mounts the elements on purchased shafts with· other 
components such as bearings and seals inside the gearbox. The gear element (referred to 
as an open gear) producers playa key role in the supply chain by providing the various 
gearbox companies with hard-to-make gear elements. The machine tools needed to 
produce high precision gears are specialized and expensive, and cannot be economically 
justified by most gearbox producers unless volume is great enough; therefore, most gear 
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elements are outsourced along with other components by the gearbox integrator. (DoC, . 
1991) 
The U.S. gear sector has long relied on defense for its principle market, especially 
on gear systems used in military helicopters. The defense market share of the U.S. 
aerospace gear market was estimated at about 70 percent of the $537 million total 
shipments in 1991. hnports of gear elements and gearing were just over 17 percent of the 
.U.S. market. Additionally, about 40 percent of the business was captive to defense prime 
contractors, notably the helicopter or gas engine turbine engine companies. For example, 
Sikorsky and Bell Helicopter each made gearboxes, as well as some gear elements. 
(DoC, 1991) 
The sharp drop in U.S. defense requirements for aerospace gears had a profound 
impact on the industry. At least six U.S. aerospace gear manufacturers have gone out of 
business, including two independent major integrated gearbox producers. This has led to 
the increased number of captive gear companies, and further isolated the remaining open 
gear subcontractors. In consideration of the reduced U;S. defense market for helicopters 
and other aircraft, exports of these items take on greater importance as a source' of 
revenue to prime contractors. This circumstance places open gear subcontractors in a 
precarious position. (DoC, 1992) 
The immediate impact of offsets on the gear industry is difficult to assess and at 
first glance might seem slight. From 1993-1995, only one offset transaction was 
designated as "gears" (SIC classification) and totaled only $402,000. However, 134 
offset transactions totaling $360 million were designated generically as "aircraft and 
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parts," offsetting U.S. prime helicopter exports. Of these, $161 million were direct 
offsets, of which $93 million were described as subcontractor activity. Some portion of 
this subcontractor activity would likely involve helicopter gears or gearing. Therefore, 
the reported $402,000 does not fully capture the extent of offsets in aerospace gears. The 
major foreign producers of aerospace gears are both larger and more globally oriented 
than their American counterparts. U.S. aerospace gear companies were more 
technologically advanced than these finns in areas such as heat treatment and grinding 
. . . 
until the early 1990's. However, offsets have resulted in additional business 
opportunities for and technology transfer to the foreign manufacturers. At the same time, 
foreign ownership of American companies increased and new foreign-owned plants were 
constructed in the United States, accelerating the diffusion of technology. Although it is 
difficult to fully evai~ate the contribution of"offsets to the present ascendancy of foreign 
gear finns, it could have been extremely significant. (DoC, 1997) 
BXA's survey of industry received responses from seven aerospace gear 
companies who all reported a negative impact of offsets on their operations. Six of the 
companies produced open . gears while one of the finns was an independent (i.e., non-
captive) gearbox producer that subcontracted for all gear elements. The gearbox maker 
reported increased overseas competition as a direct result of offsets. Each of the six open 
gear producers reported significant lost business. Other contractors reported that prime 
contractors are increasingly purchasing both gears and gear parts from ov~rseas producers . 
due to offset arrangements. (DoC, 1997) As with machine tools, these offsets introduced 
some U.S. end-user finns to new potential foreign suppliers of aerospace ge3!s, 
, . 
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relationships that will continue over time as U.S. prime contractors engage in offset 
agreements. 
Offsets, in the forms of technology transfer and co-production, have had adverse 
effects on the U.S. aerospace gear market. This extremely small and specialized market 
is both vital for the defense industrial base and vulnerable to overseas competition. 
Because of the specialization and expense of aerospace gears, must manufacturers are 
small companies (at the sub-contractor level) and rely heavily on defense related orders 
for their business. Therefore, any offset agreements made by prime contractors to 
facilitate an overseas sale that result in aerospace gear orders or technology going to 
overseas firms could have extremely serious competition, market share, and employment 
consequences for these small firms. 
Go" SUMMARY 
This chapter has examined the reactions of different sectors of the U.S. defense 
industry towards offsets. Both survey data and anecdotal evidence taken from interviews 
with defense industry re~resentatives was used. The evidence seems to suggest that 
larger firms, however reluctantly, see the need for offsets and vigo~ously defend their 
usage. They argue that the use of offsets, although not free of adverse effects, ultimately 
supports U.S. defense industry employment by creating jobs where they may have been 
lost without utilizing offsets. Additionally, offsets, in the long run, do not adversely 
effect the U.S. balance of trade and are necessary in order that U.S. "defense firms can stay 
competitive in the global arms market. 
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Medium to small fInns, however, have predominantly negative assessments. 
towards the effects of offsets on their business. The BXA survey indicated that smaller 
fIrms seem to be more negatively impacted by offsets than larger fInns and that these 
small fInns have seen a steady decline in the amount to defense related business they are 
involved in. Interviews of smaller subcontractors by the author show that this reaction 
towards offsets is still prevalent. The vast majority of smaller fIrms interviewed indicated 
that the use of offsets has had negative impacts on their employment, the amount of 
business they are doing with larger defense fmns, and their ability to compete in the 
defense marketplace due to both larger fmns sourcing subcontractor activity overseas and 
new foreign entrants into the market. 
The chapter concluded with two example of how offsets seem to have adversely 
effected two important sectors of the U.S. defense industry - the machine tool industry 
and the aerospace gear industry. In both cases, offset transactions have led to increased 
foreign participation in these sectors and a subsequent decrease in U.S. dominance of that 
particular market. These cases show that although on a macroeconomic level the effects 
of offsets on the U.S. industrial base may be diffIcult to quantify, both at the sector and 
fmn levels offset agreements are negatively impacting U.S. defense subcontractors. 
It is clear that there is a clear divide over this issue between the large defense 
fIrms and the medium and smaller sized subcontractors. Both argue that their particular 
position towards offsets is based on their desire to survive in the global marketplace. 
Large fmns see offsets as a marketing tool through which they can attract customers and 
continue making their products. Smaller fmns see offsets as an avenue where foreign 
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producers receive an unfair advantage over them, costing them work and jobs. Is there, 
and should there, be a remedy to this issue? Should the United States regulate offsets 
more closely in order to preserve the health of the U.S. defense industrial base, especially 
at the small firm level, or would the potential negative consequences (i.e., loss of 
competitiveness, fewer overseas defense contracts, and the subsequent negative side 
effects towards employment and trade) of regulating them detract from any potential 
benefits? Should market forces alone ~e allowed to solve this problem, with the customer 
ultimately going to the producer who can give them the best product? These questions 
will be explored in Chapter V. 
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v. ROLE OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT REGARDING OFFSETS 
From an industry perspective, most companies would prefer to compete on the 
basis of quality and price of their primary product, rather than participate in offset 
agreements. In general, u.s. defense fIrms are not in the co~sulting, technology, risk 
capital, or trading business. However, because of foreign government demands, offsets 
have become a recognized part of doing business with customers, and u.s. defense fIrms 
are responding to these demands. As one major defense fIrm spokesman said, "It is our 
belief, and this is a belief held throughout the defense industry, that offsets are here to 
stay" (Boeing, 1998). 
As Chapters ill and N have documented, however, there exist a wide range of 
data and opinions regarding 'both the perceived advantages and disadvantages of offsets 
for the defense industrial base. On one hand, larger fIrms maintain that offsets are 
necessary in order for u.s. defense companies to stay competitive and promote sales. 
Smaller fIrms, for the most part, claim that this marketing practice is slowly squeezing 
them out of the marketplace and if continued, will erode the U.S. defense industry at the 
subcontractor level. 
The U.S. Government is conimitted to maintaining the defense industrial base. As 
John B. Goodman, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Industrial Affairs and 
Installations said before the Senate Armed Service Committee: 
The Quadrennial Defense Review highlighted three strategic challenges 
facing the Department of Defense. DOD must seek to shape the 
international environment, respond to the full spectrum of crises that 
threaten U.S. interests, and prepare now for an uncertain future. To meet 
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these challenges and support the required revolution in military affairs, 
DOD must be able to draw on a supplier base that can design and produce 
next generation weapons, innovate to· preserve our technological 
leadership, reduce cycle times to respond to evolving threats,. lower costs 
significantly, and support interoperability for joint and coalition warfare 
wit hou'r allies. (Goodman, 1998) 
One of DoD's strategies for accomplishing this is to "Maintain effective competition 
(both horizontal and vertical) in the defense industrial base" (Goodman, 1998). 
Thus, because of the U.S. Government's stated policy goal of maintaining 
America's defense industrial base, it is inescapably involved in offsets. The U.-S. 
Government becomes involved in this process by restricting certain types of technology 
transfer, third country transfer prohibitions, and various legislative and administrative 
mandates designed to oversee the effect of offset agreements on u.S. political, economic, 
and military interests. However, the increasing demand for offsets has raised concerns 
that existing policy guidance is inadequate to protect U.S. security and economic 
interests. Both within the industrial sector and Congress, increased restrictions are being 
called for in order to prevent some of the potentially adverse effects of offsets described 
above. Once again, the level of Governmen~ involvement is a contenti0ll:s issue. J~es 
McInerney, Jr., then executive Vice-President of. the American League of Exporting 
Security Assistance, said at a Government/industry conference that "Those things 
[offsets] need to be business deals among business men ... Government has no business 
overseeing offsets" (FAS, 1994). 
This chapter will explain the current U.S. Government policy regarding offsets 
and will then explore varying levels of Government. involvement in this practice. Both 
76 
the potential advantages and disadvantages will be explained. The chapter concludes 
with explanations of previous attempts to regulate offsets in international defense trade. 
A. CURRENT GOVERNMENT POLICY REGARDING OFFSETS 
The Duncan Memorandum of 1978, described in Chapter 2, established the U.S.' 
policy regarding offsets until 1989. The National Defense Authorization Act of .1989 
legislated a statutory requirement for the Executive Branch to publish a policy on offsets 
in military exports. The Bush Administration issued its policy statement on April 16, 
1990 and it read in part: 
No agency of the U.S. Government shall encourage, enter directly into, or 
commit U.S. fIrms to any offset arrangements in connection with the sale 
"of defense goods or services to foreign governments. 
U.S. Government .funds shall not be use4 to fInance offsets in security 
assistance transactions except in accordance with currently established 
policies and procedures. " 
Nothing in this policy shall prevent agencies of the U.S. Government from 
fulfIlling obligations incurred through international agreements entered 
into prior to the issuance of this policy. 
The decision whether to engage in offsets, and the responsibility for 
negotiating and implementing offset arrangements, resides with the 
companies involved. 
Any exception to this policy must be approved by the President through 
the National Security Council. 
The President also noted that the time has come to consult with our friends 
and allies regarding the use of offsets in defense procurement. He has, 
therefore, directed the Secretary of Defense; in coordination with the 
Secretary of State, to lead an .interagency team to" consult with foreign 
nations with a view to limiting the adverse effects of offsets in defense 
procurement. The interagency team will report periodically on the results 
of these consultations and forward any recommendations to the National 
Security Council. (OffIce of the Press Secretary, "1990) 
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The policy stated above recognizes that offsets do exist as a method of doing 
business, but that the U.S. Government will neither offer offsets nor enter into offset 
agreements in order to facilitate a foreign military sale. However, the U.S. Government 
will not prevent private companies from entering into these agreements, subject to U.S. 
Government oversight, as long as the private company assumes all responsibility for the 
facilitation of the agreement. The Clinton Administration has thus far endorsed the Bush 
policy. In 1993, then Deputy Secretary of Defense William Perry said; 
We view the decisions regarding offsets as matters best len to u.S. 
industry to negotiate and implement as part of their ongoing business 
activities. The principal objective of the current policy is to give U.S. 
companies the flexibility to structure arrangements that allow them to 
compete effectively for foreign sales. If U.S. defense manufacturers were 
unable to provide offsets, foreign governments would often be unable to 
raise domestic political support for defense purchases from the U.S., and 
U.S. industry would lose sales to foreign competitors willing to provide 
offsets. (FAS, 1994) 
While the Executive Branch views offsets as an economically inefficient irritant, 
it also recognizes them as a marketing technique and a form of export financing. 
Realizing that the government making the arms purchase has objectives beyond procuring 
arms at a cost effeCtive price such as political acceptability, the maint~nance of domestic 
defense and commercial industries, and preserving foreign exchange, it follows that U.S. 
offset policies are influenced by foreign policy/national security concerns that may 
conflict with economic efficiency. These concerns include the following; 
Offset agreements 'help facilitate amis transfers which enhance the 
preparedness of allies and friends by providing them with the tools to 
defend themselves .. 
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Cooperative agr<?ements, coproduction, and licensed production contribute 
to our allied preparedness by enhancing our allies' ability to contribute to 
the productive capacity of the entire alliance. 
Coproduction and licensed production offset agreements promote 
rationalization, standardization and interoperability with our allies by 
providing for the use of common weapons systems. 
Offsets directly contribute to foreign sales, but also reduce the cost of DoD 
purchases by allowing U.S. producers to allocate overhead costs across a 
large base, thus contributing to economies of scale. The additional 
business also enhances the overall health of the U.S. industrial base. 
(OMB,1990) 
Some may view the Executive Branch's position as a predominantly laissez-faire 
policy, avoiding offsets by allowing private businesses to negotiate the details of offset 
agreements subject to some" U.S. Government oversight to ensure national security is not 
compromised. However, since preserving the U.S. industrial base is a priority of the 
Clinton Administration, what level of U.S." Government involvement is necessary to 
protect the U.S. industrial base, ensure national security; yet also foster competitiveness? 
B. LEVELSOFGOVERNMENTENVOLVEMENT 
1. Non-Involvement 
Total non-involvement by the U~S. Government would mean that oversight of 
offset agreements would be left to private businesses. Not only would private companies 
be the negotiators of these" agreements, they would also be responsible for regulating 
these agreements to ensure that U.S. national security would not be compromised. 
Proponents of this policy argue that a free and open defense trade market would ensure 
that the best, most capable weapons would be delivered at the lowest cost. Additionally, 
some in business believe that offset decisions should be left in the hands of those 
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companies involved in the agreement, " ... we are in the best position to judge what is 
needed to win a particular competition ... and what technology can be transferred without 
jeopardy to our future competitive position" (Hessler, 1988). 
Total non-involvement, however, is simply not an option when decisions 
regarding the promUlgation of defense related technology are involved. There are too 
many potential risks to national security in the areas of both arms .and technology transfer. 
U.S. Government oversight is necessary to ensure that national security is not 
compromised while still allowing companies to be competitive in the global arms market. 
All four prime contractors interviewed for this thesis stated that although less government 
involvement in their business affairs was desirable it was unrealistic to expect the U.s. 
Government to reduce its oversight role in the sale of defense items. 
U.S. Government interest in offsets is.also spurred by the complaints of defense 
subcontractors. Small- to medium-sized subcontractors are increasingly complaining to 
elected officials about how offsets are hurting their respective industries (DoC, 1998). 
Six small- to medium-sized businesses interviewed for this thesis insisted that increased 
U.S. Government involvement in controlling offsets. was necessary to prevent the demise 
of their particular defense industry (for example, machine tooling or gear production) due 
to increased overseas production or reductions in business work orders. 
Congressional interest in offsets has increased and Congress will not allow this 
trade practice to be unregulated. Since 1984, eight GAO reports have dealt with the 
practice of offsets and their effects on the U.S. defense industry. In 1987 Representative 
Barbara Kennelly of Connecticut introduced a bill requiring the President to engage in 
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bilateral and multilateral negotiations with foreign governments to limit the use of offsets 
in defense sales (Woodward, 1995). Congressional legislation introduced by 
Representative Alan Dixon of lllinois in 1989 requires the Department of Commerce to 
. . . 
compile and submit an annual report detailing the use of offsets in the defense trade 
(OMB, 1990). In 1994, Senator Russell Feingold of Wisconsin introduced legislation 
that requires the President, on high dollar weapons sales, to certify to Congress whether 
offsets will ~e inv~lved in a weapons sale (Russin, 1994). The level of Congressional 
interest in offsets is further illustrated by the fact that five pairs of Congressional 
committees (Foreign Affairs, Armed Services, Banking, Commerce, and Government 
Operations) currently exert some sort of jurisdiction over offsets in military trade (OMB, 
1990). In August of 1998, Congressmen Henry Waxman of California and John Tierney 
of Massachusetts conducted hearings in Boston, Massachusetts to discuss and assess how 
offsets affect defense subcontractors. Additionally, the offset issue will be on the 
Congressional agenda next session (l05th Congress): Congress is considering modifying 
Section 309 offset reporting requirements and and lobbying for international offset 
consultations with the European Union. 
2. Negotiations 
The legal authority for the U.S. Government to negotiate limitations on military 
, 
offsets with other governments derives from several sources. Under the Constitution, the 
power to regulate commerce with' foreign nations resides with the Congress, while the 
. . 
President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, has the constitutional power to make 
treaties. The Trade Agreements Act of 1934 and successor legislation have augmente:d 
, . 
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the authority of the President to enter into and enforce trade agreements to reduce both 
tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade. Separate constitutional and legislative authority 
exists for regulating the foreign transfer of military goods and related services and 
technology for national security or foreign policy reasons. Generally, the U.S. 
Government enters into three types of trade agreements - unilateral, bilateral, and 
multilateral. 
a. Unilateral Agreements 
Unilateral agreements are where the U.S. Government legislates a national 
trade policy, forcing U.S. companies to adhere to it. However, this type of agreement is 
solely a U.S. policy - other countries neither enter into this agreement nor are bound to 
observe it. fu the case of a unilateral policy restricting offsets, the U.S. Government 
would restrict U.S. companies from engaging in offset activities - companies would have· 
to enter into arms agreements on a strictly cash basis. 
The only real advantage of a unilateral restriction is that it would reduce 
the amount of U.S. Government effort involved in overseeing and regulating these 
agreements. The potential disadvantages, however, are significant to U.S. businesses. If· 
the U.S. unilaterally restricted the use of offsets but foreign countries did not follow suit, 
the end result would be a shift in am1s sales away from U.S. businesses to other producers 
where purchasers could not only purchase weapons systems but also secure advantageous 
offset agreements (Johnson, 1987). Most countries would shift their weapons purchases 
away from the U.S. to countries still offering offsets, hurting the defense industry. For 
example, one unilateral restriction that the U.S. Government does impose on U.S. 
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businesses is that they may not utilize bribery to help facilitate sales agreements, a 
practice common in many other countries. As a result, U.S. companies have lost some 
sales overseas (DoC, 1998). A unilateral restriction on offsets would reduce U.S. 
companies' ability to compete head-to-head for sales, resulting in fewer sales, less market 
share, and a loss of defense related jobs. These ill effects would eventually be felt at all 
levels of the defense industry as decreasing weapons sales reduced the output of prime 
and sub-contractors. All companies interviewed for this thesis were opposed to a 
unilateral offset policy claiming that this policy would reduce their ability to compete in 
the defense market. 
Another type of unilateral policy that the U.S. Government could pursue in 
order to protect the U.S. defense industrial base would be to nationalize, or underwrite, 
the defense industry. This policy would be similar to the defense industrial policy in 
France. Such a policy would greatly increase the Governmental control of this industry 
and, potentially, provide U.S. defense contractors with a great deal of economic security. 
Therefore, some of the problems posed by offsets (reduced trade, employment, and 
. competitiveness) would be alleviated since the U.S. GoveIllIilent would provide an 
economic "safety net" for defense contractors. However, this type of unilateral defense 
policy is extremely unlikely. First, pursuing a nationalized defense industry may lead to 
inferior defense products since the necessity to develop the best product in order to 
compete would be minimized. Second, nationalizing an industry directly contradicts the 
free market, capitalist philosophy that the U.S. economy is based upon. The third, and 
probably most important, argument against pursuing this type of policy is that huge 
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monetary outlays would be required to implement it. In this era of shrinking U.S. 
Government budgets, it is extremely unlikely that this type of expensive industrial policy 
would be widely supported by legislators. 
b. Bilateral and Multilateral Agreements 
Bilateral and multilateral trade agreements are those the United States 
negotiates with one country or several countries, respectively. In these cases, the 
signatory c~untrie~ agree to honor and enforce the conditions of. the treaty being 
negotiated. All of the companies interviewed for this thesis stated that bilateral or 
multilateral treaties were the best avenues by which the U.S. Government could control 
the use of offsets. Three large companies, however, greatly favored multilateral treaties 
since such a treaty, by definition, would involve more customers and partners in the 
global marketpHlce. 
The primary advantage of a bilateral agreement is that they are relatively 
easy to negotiate since the U.S. would be dealing with only one country/economic entity. 
Especially if the United States could apply some leverage to that country, very 
advantageous agreements' could be made that both facilitated a beneficial sale for the 
arms manufacturer and also limited the types and size of any offset (DoC, 1998). An 
example of a bilateral trade agreement that has both been economically fair and equitably 
enforced is the U.S.-EC agreement on Large Civil Aircraft that was negotiated as part of 
the. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) treaty. This agre~ment ended the . 
competition for giving the lowest interest rates on aircraft export sales, further enabling 
the sale of large aircraft to be based solely on the quality of the product and best pri~e 
, . 
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(DoC, 1998). The agreement also established limits on government support (subsidies) 
for the development of new aircraft and increased the requirements for the disclosure of 
government support for these aircraft (Barber & Scott, 1995). Bilateral agreements do 
have drawbacks, however. A country may enter a bilateral agreement with the U.S. 
agreeing not to ask for offsets from U.S. producers and then tum to other suppliers who 
still offer offsets. This lost sale certainly would not benefit any sector of the U.S. defense 
industrial base. Additionally, laxly ~nforced bilateral agreements could simply drive 
offset practices underground, both disadvantaging U.S. producers and creating a new 
arena of illegal trade practices (Johnson, 1988). 
Multilateral agreements would prevent signatory countries from avoiding 
U.S. suppliers and looking elsewhere for offset agreements since they could not be 
offered by the other major arms producers. Additionally; enforcement of these 
agreements may be somewhat easier since it would be to the economic advantage of all 
signatory countries to maintain an equitable level of competition. An example of a 
multilateral agreement is the 1979 GATT civil aircraft. code which was agreed upon and 
s~gned by 22 countries. This agreement prohibits tariffs on civil aircraft, engines~ and 
most aircraft components, established rules on potentially discriminatory governmental 
actions, and bans the use of export subsidies for manufactured goods (Barber & Scott, 
1995). The primary disadvantage of multilateral agreements is that they are difficult to 
negotiate since countries. with varying economic and military goals would be involved 
(for example, the 1979 GATT aircraft code has not yet been revised and incorporated into 
the Wodd Trade Organization because the signatory countries can not agree on the tariff 
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and subsidy provisions for the new code). Many buying countries that request offsets see 
them as too advantageous to negotiate away in a multilateral agreement. In order to work, 
the U.S. would have to sign multilateral agreements with all major arms producers 
limiting the use of offsets. 
The better type of agreement for the United States to use in order to limit 
the use of offsets would be a multilateral treaty. Although difficult to form, it would be 
more beneficial for the U.S. since purchasing countries would be less able to simply take 
their business to other offset-offering arms producers. Although offsets may not be 
completely eliminated as a trade practice, multilateral agreements could clearly define 
and limit offset practices in order to assure fair competition and guard against any 
restraint of trade". It must be emphasized, however, that these agreements need to be 
formed primarily with other seller nations in order to maintain fair competition. An 
excellent example of a multilateral agreement involving a weapons system is that 
between the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands for the development 
and procurement of the Joint Strike Fighter. These three nations have shared in the 
research and development costs of the aircraft and will also share costs during the 
production phase. Each country possesses partial ownership of the aircraft and, as of this 
writing, no offset requirements have been stipulated between these countries for the 
procurement of the aircraft (DoC, 1998). 
C. THE GATT AND NATO DISCUSSIONS ON OFFSETS 
Increased demands by foreign governments for offsets associated with purchases 
of U.S. arms and the possible negative impact of these demands on the U.S. industrial 
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base and trade interests have raised concerns within the U.S. Government and American 
defense industries. The defense industry's concerns regarding offset legislation stem 
from the fear that any legislation aimed at countering such practices would simply result 
in the customer turning to another supplier who is not encumbered by offset restrictions. 
While they oppose the U.S. Government adopting unilateral pro.visions restricting offset 
agreements, the defense industry does endorse steps taken in a bilateral or multilateral 
fashion. Their recommendations originate from their desire to compete in the 
marketplace and long term survival. As explained previously in this chapter, the U.S. 
Government views offsets as it bothersome yet useful tool in protecting the national 
security of the United States. This section will highlight two of the treaties the U.S. has 
pursued to limit the practice of offsets. 
1. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 
The GAIT is the principal international body concerned with negotiating the 
reduction of trade barriers and with international trading relations. The original GAIT 
document contains several exceptions, including a broadly worded "Security Exceptions" 
article. Articl~ XXI, among other things, exempts the actions taken by the contracting· 
parties with respect to "animunition and implements of war . . . for the purpose of 
supplying a military establishment'" from the obligations contained in the other GAIT 
articles (OMB, 1990). This treaty "loophole" has enabled the facilitation and growth of 
offsets aSsociated with the sale of military articles. 
Over the last 30 years, the GATT's activities and its legal instruments have been 
expanded in response to shifts in the global economic structure. During the Tokyo Round 
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of multilateral negotiations an Agreement on Government Procurement was written for a 
sector which heretofore had not been subject the GATT disciplines. This code provides 
for national, non-discriminatory treatment by signatory governments and the specific-
agencies of those governments as agreed among the signatories. While some defense 
agencies are covered by this code, "procurement indispensable for national security or for 
national defense purposes" is, once again, excepted. (Eisenhour, 1989) 
As part of the Uruguay Round ?f multilateral trade negotiations, the United States 
has proposed several areas currently covered by GATT rules that need strengthening as 
well as development and application of GATT rules to new trade areas. In an area 
directly related to military offsets, the Agreement on Government Procurement, there 
have been ongoing efforts to tighten the disciplinary provision of the agreement, expand 
the entity coverage, extend the participation in the agreement· to new signatories, and 
apply the agreement to services. While governmental actions, services, and procurements 
related to national defense are not currently under consideration as targets of GATT 
modification, improved discipline in related areas of gpvernmental activity could reduce 
s~me of the possible negative impacts of military offsets. (OMB, 1990) 
2. NATO Discussions 
In light of new world power realities, a concept has emerged that a new "defense 
trade GATT" is needed. On March 15, 1990, Ambassador William H. Taft, IV, U.S. 
Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) advocated 
this approach: 
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In the world defense trade arena ... no generally agreed rules of the road 
exist. Consequently, the defense trade market is characterized by 
protectionism, subsidization and suspicion. To address this we should 
consider the utility of establishing the equivalent of a defense GATT ... 
Like the 97-member GATT, the NATO defense GATT would have to 
recognize the political requirements of international defense trade. Any 
such deviations from open, nondiscriminatory trading practices would, 
however, in this case at least be on the table and visible to all members; 
exceptions would be seen to be exceptions. 
All nations have trade restricting practices in defense - Buy American, 
Buy European. All countries participating in ·the defense GATT would 
have to expose these restrictions. An open, efficient international market 
in defense goods will clearly be worth the compromises each nation will 
have to make, especially knowing that all others are making the same 
compromises. (OMB, 1990) 
For a two-year period (1992-1993) extensive meetings took place at NATO and in 
member capitals to establish a generic "ground rules" document to initiate a defense trade 
discussion ·at NATO among the allies. The draft "NATO Code of Conduct in Defense 
Trade" was to define the "Principles for Improving Defense Trade Among the Allies" 
including transparency of national procurements, contracting and auditing procedures, 
quality control, technology transfer, re-export requirements, and removal of barriers to 
defense trade. 
offsets: 
The following statement was included in the draft Code of Conduct regarding 
Offsets constitute an integral part of the industrial policy of certain 
countries. Nevertheless, those. countries will progressively reduce, 
towards timely elimination, their offset requirements, once they have noted 
real progress in the opening up of markets, in the transfer of technology, 
and in the participation in common research, development, and production 
programs. This process towards elimination will be reciprocal, and will 
take into account the different approaches to defense trade among the 
members of the Alliance. (NATO, 1993) 
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fu late 1993 an agreement to fonnally approve the Code of Conduct and move into the 
implementation phase failed. Although offset language alone was not the reason for the 
failure to reach final agreement, it did remain an issue of debate until the discussions 
were suspended. Even the rather expansive statement of principle regarding gradual 
elimination of offsets was viewed by some nations as posing serious difficulties, while 
t~e U.S. saw this language as providing inadequate discipline on offsets. Further 
discussions of offsets within NATO were, consequently, never agreed on among the 
allies. (DoC, 1996) 
D. SUMMARY 
Presently, the United States Government's role with regards to offsets is that of 
oversight. It only gets involved in the offset agreements made between U.S: anus 
producers and foreign buyers to ensure that vital technology or weapons systems are not 
being transferred. Although the U.S. Government recognizes that offsets are a trade 
distortion and can have negative impacts on the U.S. economy, they do tolerate their use 
. so that U.S. anus producers can maintain competitiveness in an ever-increasing 
competitive global anus market. However, treaties limiting the use of offsets would be 
beneficial for all parties: prime contractors would be able to compete their products based 
solely on price, capability,· and delivery schedule; U.S. subcontractors would be less 
prone to lost market share and jobs due to increased foreign competition nurtured by 
offsets; and the U.S. Government's national security concerns would be satisfied since 
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their oversight of anns sales would continue but without having to regulate the use of 
varying types of offsets. 
If treaties are to be used, the most advantageous instrument for the U.S. 
Government to utilize would be a multilateral treaty (similar to the GATT trade treaties) 
signed by all major global anns producers. A multilateral treaty would be more difficult 
to write but would be far more beneficial for the United States in the long run. It would 
prevent buyer countries from avoiding U.S. anns manufacturers and taking their business 
elsewhere so that they could obtain offset agreements. Additionally, a ~ultilateral treaty 
would be easier to enforce since all the signatory nations would strive to enforce it in 
order to prevent an "rogue" seller nation from gaining an unfair competiti~e advantage. 
Although preliminary talks and some negotiations have been attempted on offsets, 
no treaty limiting their use has been signed. While multilateral trade agreements 
regarding civil aircraft and other products have existed for several years, defense related 
multilateral agreements that include offset limiting provisions are in their infancy. While 
the poten~ial "benefits of these agreements are attractive, it will be difficult to resolve a 
number of threshold issues in order to conduct the negotiation stage with a reasonable 
expectation of both a timely and successful result. 
One obstacle is that the GATT treaties that codify international trade relations 
contain clauses that exempt trade related to a country's national security. This exception 
provides anns sellers and purchasers broad leeway with which to design anns sales aimed· 
at bolstering a country's national security. Understandably, the maintenance of national 
security and methods by which a country does so can be very sensitive. Many countries 
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are extremely hesitant to relinquish any tool they may have (offsets in this case) to build 
and sustain their national defense. 
Another obstacle to an offset-limiting treaty is that in the current global arms 
market, it is the buyer countries that have the leverage. Both declining defense budgets 
and arms purchases are forcing arms producers to offer increasingly lucrative offset 
packages to stay competitive. Certainly, purchasing countries do not want to sacrifice 
these deals and will not easily agree to any treaty whose aim is to phase out this trade 
practice. Additionally, any multilateral treaty would have to be signed by all major arms 
producers within a very close time frame. If not, one or more countries still offering 
offsets would gain a huge advantage over those countries not offering them, possibly 
inflicting large damage on the economies and defense industrial bases of the treaty 
signers. 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The enhanced national security of the United States is the ultimate aim of the 
nation's foreign policy. One of the primary methods used to carry out our foreign and 
national security policy has been and still remains the transfer of defense articles, defense 
services, military training, and economic assistance or, stating it another way, by 
, ' 
providing security assistance. Not, only is security assistance used to aid other nations, it 
also furthers U.S. interests by enhancing deterrence, strengthening alliances, promoting 
regional stability, ensuring access to vital overseas facilities, improving U.S. power 
projection and forward defense capabilities, and reinforcing relationships in. order to 
assure access to'vital raw materials. U.S. policy-makers have increasingly utilized this 
practice both during the Cold W cir to contain communism and after the demise of the 
Soviet Union in order to maintain regional stability in an ever-increasing unstable world. 
Just as security assistance has increased, so has the use of offsets. These 
compensation type agreements between arms purchasers and sellers have enjoyed 
growing popularity for several reasons. For the U.S. arms seller, they help win defense 
contracts, an increasingly difficult task in this era, of reduced defense budgets and 
growing competition. For the weapons buyer, offsets are extremely attractive. Not only 
can· they reduce the overall price of a weapons system, they may also assist the buying 
country in pursuing its own economic development agenda. The use of offsets, however, 
, . 
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is being increasingly monitored by U.S. Government agencies in response to the concerns 
of both defense contractors and Congressional representatives. 
Offsets, at least for the near future, are here to stay and will be increasingly 
utilized by weapons sellers and buyers alike. While offsets are valuable as a marketing 
tool, their use does pose some problems to the U.S. defense indu,strial base that can not be 
ignored. Negative repercussions on the employment, trade, and the competitiveness of 
American defense businesses may arise if the use of offsets is not 'carefully considered, 
planned, and regulated. 
B. CONCLUSIONS 
The scope of this research effort has led to several conclusions concerning the use, 
growth, and future control of offset agreements. 
Conclusion 1. The use of offsets to facilitate overseas weapons sales is' 
extremely prevalent due to increased competition and customer requirements. 
Simply put, the use of offsets is now commonplace and they are not going to go 
away. As a result of the U.S. defense procurement budget steadily decreasing since the 
. end of the Cold War, domestic arms manufacturers have become increasingly. dependent 
on overseas markets. Therefore, they are willing to formulate offset agreements if, by so 
doing, they can guarantee a sale; U.S. weapons sellers, in order to stay competitive and 
win contracts, are agreeing to these increasing offset requirements rather than risk losing 
business. Additionally, weapons buyers are imposing mal'ly types of offset requirements 
as a condition of sale. Not only do these offsets help reduce the total purchase price, 
these agreements can also help the purchasing country pursue other domestic economic 
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goals. As the demand for offset transactions has increased, so has the monetary value and 
length of these offset obligations, forcing U.S. businesses to become immersed in this 
trade practice. 
Conclusion 2. The macroeconomic effects of offsets on the U.S. defense 
industry are inconclusive. 
The 1990 OMB study on the effects of offsets on the U.S. defense industry 
contained serious errors in both its scope and data collection. OMB concluded that the 
net result of the transactions discussed in their report had a favorable effect on the U.S. 
economy. However, these results were reached by using suspect data obtained from 
prime contractors, referencing outdated input -output tables, and making broad 
generalizations on how various offsets would effect the economy. When DoC took over 
the annual reporting requirement for offsets, they did not conduct any analyses on how 
offsets were effecting the defense industry. Their rationale for not conducting this 
analysis was that it was too difficult to measure the long-term effects of all offset 
transactions (especially indirect offsets) on the entire U.S. defense industry. In essence, 
the scope of the offset analysis was too large and involved too many unknowns, 
precluding the formulation of any valid conclusions. 
Conclusion 3. Weapons purchasers will continue to demand more indirect 
offsets then direct offsets when formulating offset agreements. 
Currently, the ratio of indirect offsets to direct offsets is approximately 60/40. As 
more countries with less developed economies and defense infrastructures purchase 
weapons systems from U.S. arms manufacturers, this trend should continue. Indirect 
offsets are more useful to the economic and industrial goals of these lesser developed 
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countries since they can take a variety of different forms (investment, technology transfer, 
countertrade, etc.) and may offer more economic benefit and opportunities. Since direct 
offsets are directly related to the weapons system being purchased, their utility is limited. 
Many lesser developed countries are not solely intent on building their domestic defense 
industries. Indirect offsets may be preferred in order to strengthen non-defense sectors of 
the economy. Additionally, while nations possessing a more mature defense industrial 
base may de.sire so~e direct offsets, indirect offsets can also be quite at~active. All arms 
purchasers can utilize the benefits of indirect offsets while direct offsets are useful to only 
a fraction of this group. 
Conclusion 4. Large and small defense subcontractors have widely 
disparaging views on the advantages and disadvantages of using offsets as a 
marketing tool. 
Both an' extensive literature review and interviews with large defense contractors 
revealed that, although they would prefer not to use offsets, large contractors do see them 
as necessary for business. Large contractors claim that without offset agreements, foreign 
buyers would simply take their business elsewhere. Therefore, using offsets reaps 
benefits by promoting overseas business, maintaining domestic defense employment, and 
allowing contractors to stay competitive in the global arms market. 
A majority of small- to medium-sized defense contractors, however, claim that 
offsets are slowly eroding the U.S. defense industrial base at the subcontractor level. 
They argue that the large contractOrs who formulate the offset agreements ate passing the 
. . 
costs of these agreements down to the lower tiered contractors. These costs come in 
various forms - contract work being done overseas, the establishment of overseas c~-
, . 
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production plants, and. technology transfer. As a result of these offset transactions, 
smaller subcontractors are facing increased unfair competition (since large contractors are 
contractually obligated to have subcontractor work performed overseas) and are receiving. 
less work orders. Consequently, some companies have to diversify out of the defense 
business, decrease employment and overhead, or close. Both Bureau of Export Analysis 
data and specific industrial sector analyses presented in this thesis tend to support the 
conclusion that offsets are having a negative impact for smaller defense contractors. 
Conclusion 5. The role of the U.S. Government in the monitoring and 
regulation of offsets is ambiguous. 
The U.S. Government has a vested interest in the monitoring and regulation of 
offsets, both from a national security point of view and the Plaintenance of its domestic 
industrial base. However, U.S. Government responsibility for these agreements was 
waived in 1978 with the Duncan Memorandum, and the Government's role became one 
of oversight. While the Government accepts that offsets may be necessary for weapons 
sales, they are primarily seen as ~ economically inefficient irritant used by the private 
sector as a marketing tool. Large contractors are hesitant to agree to increased Federal 
involvement, fearing offset restrictions' that may reduce their global competitiveness. 
Smaller businesses, however, argue that without some sort of Government control the 
defense industrial base is being slowly eroded at the subcontractor level. 
Currently, five pairs of Congressional committees have a hand in offsets and there 
is mounting Congressional concern regarding their use and their long-term effects on the 
domestic economy. The Department of State and Department of Defense are the 
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Executive agencies responsible for reviewing offset agreements. The Department of 
Commerce is responsible for monitoring and reporting offset transactions despite the fact 
that the DoC may have a conflict of interest since they are also responsible for promoting 
international trade for American businesses. Clearly, the oversight, regulation, and 
reporting of offset agreements are extremely convoluted and complex processes. 
Conclusion 6. While unilateral and bilateral offset policies are possible, the 
most beneficial trade agreements for U.S. defense businesses are multilateral 
agreements. 
Unilateral offset policies should be avoided since they will mO,st likely result in 
weapons purchasers taking their defense business to other countries. Bilateral 
agreements, while relatively easy to negotiate, may still result in lost business for U.S. 
arms producers. Multilateral trade agreements would prevent signatory countries from 
avoiding U.S. suppliers and looking elsewhere for offset agreements. Additionally, 
enforcement of these agreements would be easier since it would be economically 
advantageous to all signatory countries to maintain an equitable level of competitlon. 
'While multilateral agreements may not eliminate offsets, they could clearly define and 
limit offset practices in order to assure fair competition and prevent any restraint of trade. 
C. RECO:M:MENDATIONS 
Based on the conclusions of this research, the following recommendations are 
made: 
Recommendation 1. Conduct a study to assess' the effects of offsets on the' 
defense industrial base by either measuring the impacts of direct offsets or by 
targeting specific industrial sectors. 
. . 
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Attempting to measure and analyze the effects of all offsets on the entire economy 
is an extremely daunting problem. It would require prohibitive man-hour and monetary 
resources to conduct an accurate and comprehensive study. As opposed to attempting to· 
assess the impacts of offsets on the entire defense industrial. base, a study that is much 
narrower in scope should be conducted. One method would be to measure the impacts of 
direct offsets on the economy. Since direct offsets are associated only with the specific 
weapons system being sold, the long-term economic effects would be easier to accurately 
track and analyze. Indirect offsets, because they may impact any sector of the economy, 
can be extremely difficult to monitor. An alternative method would be to conduct offset 
studies targeting specific industrial sectors of the defense industry (for example, 
fabricated metal products or valves). While these studies would not encompass the entire 
offset situation, the data collected and analysis completed would, hopefully, be accurate 
and enable some realistic generalizations to be made. 
Recommendation 2. The U.S. Government should encourage both U.S. 
contractors and weapons purchasers to use more direct offsets. 
Indirect offsets pose several problems for the U.S. defense indushi:al base. First, 
by definition they involve goods or exports that are not related to the weapons system 
being purchased. Therefore, they can be extremely difficult to track. Additionally, 
indirect offsets may have far-reaching adverse effects on several different sectors of the 
U.S. economy, not only those associated with the defense industry. It is in the U.S.' 
national security interest to encourage its allies to purchase American weapons systems 
and to assist them in arming themselves. Direct offsets aid in this process. Indirect 
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offsets, however, are u~ed by some countries as a part of their economic development 
strategy. The United States should not be fostering this growth at the risk of harming its 
own economy. 
Recommendation 3. The U.S. Government must take a more active role 
protecting crucial sectors of the defense industrial base. 
It is the policy of the United States to protect its defense industrial base. While 
this does not mean that the Government should curtail free trade or fair competition, it is 
in the Government's best interest to protect highly specialized and essential sectors of the 
defense industry (for example, machine tools). Offsets have had adverse impacts on 
some of these sectors. Since many of these industries consist of very small contractors 
and family owned businesses, the results of offset agreements that send work overseas 
can be .devastating, driving some of these essential businesses out of the market and 
reducing the aggregate U.S. defense industrial base. The U.S. Government should 
determine those sectors of the economy that are extremely vital for the defense industry 
and implement measures that will help protect them from adverse offset agreements. 
Recommendation 4. The U.S. Government should review and streamline its 
offset tracking and monitoring process. 
The U.S. Government should review and modify, as necessary, current U.S. 
Government policy on offsets in defense trade and respond to the changing nature of 
offset demands, reflecting both the need for U.S. firms to remain competitive in 
international arms markets and the need to maintain the U.S.' defense industrial base. 
There are presently nine Federal agencies or Congressional bodies involved in 
offset regulation, monitoring, and approval. . In order to gain greater control over offsets, 
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some degree of process re-engineering is required that would reduce both the number of 
agencies involved and the procedural and regulatory processes associated with offset 
agreements and implementation. 
Recommendation 5. The U.S. Government should continue consultations 
with its trading partners in order to form multilateral agreements which limit the 
adverse effects of offsets in defense trade. 
The United States has already implemented consultations with its trading partners 
on offsets in the defense trade and related military procurement issues. These 
consultations should continue, with the intent of initiating multilateral agreements that 
will limit the use of offsets in the defense trade. If necessary, negotiations could begin at 
the bilateral level, eventually proceeding to multilateral levels in a larger forum, such as 
NATO. The United States should be cautious, however, and not make any decisions to 
unilaterally limit offsets. 
Recommendation 6. The U.S. Government should continue consultations 
with the defense industrial base on offsets. 
The U.S. Government should consult with major U.S. arms producers, including 
both primes and subcontractors and suppliers, and with labo~ to seek their positions on 
minimizing the adverse effects of offsets in the defense trade. 
D. FUTURE RESEARCH AREAS 
This thesis evaluated the effects of offsets on the defense industrial base. As such, 
this study covered only a portion of the issues surrounding this complex topic. The 
following areas are recommended for further research: 
• Evaluate the effects of offsets on a specific industrial sector of the defense 
industrial base (for example, the effects of offsets on the aerospace gear sector 
of the economy). Attempt to determine whether the impacts of offsets on a 
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particular defense sector can be accurately measured and what generalizations . 
can be drawn relating these results to the entire defense industrial base. 
• Assess the feasibility of the U.S. entering into either a bilateral or multilateral 
treaty restricting the use of offsets. Determine what the conditions of such a 
treaty would be and how it could be equitably enforced. A useful model may 
be the current GATT treaties on civil aircraft trade or the current Joint Strike 
Fighter production venture which includes the United States, the United 
Kingdom, and the Netherlands. 
• Evaluate the ramifications of U.S. defense contractors offering only direct 
offsets when negotiating a weapons sale. Would this be a realistic strategy or 
would it result in arms buyers taking their business elsewhere? 
• Currently, the U.S. does not require offsets when purchasing weapons systems 
from other countries. Conduct a study examining the advantages and 
disadvantages of a U.S. policy whereby it would require offsets when 
purchasing weapons systems. 
• Research possible methods of streamlining and/or re-engineering the current 
offset approval and oversight systems. This analysis could include both a 
modification in the offset approval process or possible changes to the 
involvement of different Federal organizations in this process. . 
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APPENDIX A. SUMMARY OF INDUSTRY INTERVIEWS 
. During July and August of 1998, the author conducted telephonic interviews with 
spokesmen representing different sectors of the defense industry (interviewees requested 
that their names be withheld). The purpose of these interviews was to gain their opinions 
and insights into how offsets were effecting both their particular business and the overall 
u.s. defense industrial base. For purposes of this thesis, small- to medium-sized 
businesses are defined as those with 500 or fewer employees. The int<?rview questions 
were modeled after those questions asked by the Bureau of Export Analysis' Competitive 
Enhancement and Diversification Needs Survey. The following questions. were asked in 
the interviews: 
• Has your firm been involved in an offset agreement? 
• Has your firm been negatively affected by offset agreement practices? 
• HaS your firm been positively affected by offset agreements? 
• Is any type of legislation/regulation needed to control the use of offsets? How 
would your firm be affected by this control? 
• If no changes are made in how the defense industry utilizes offsets, what could 
be the long-term consequences for you company? 
The large companies represented were Boeing Corporation (237,000 employees, 
aircraft and aircraft parts sector), Bell-Textron (65,000 employees, aircraft and aircraft 
parts sector), United Defense Limited Partnership (40,000 employees, ground combat 
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vehicle sector), and Hughes Missile Systems (35,000 employees, missile and space 
vehicles sector). 
The small- to medium-sized businesses represented were Aero-Gear mcorporated 
(150 employees, aerospace gear sector), Aero-Tech Support Systems, mcorporated (370 
employees, turbine engine parts/airframe components sectors), B&E Tool Company (75 
employees, fabricated metal products sector), Dynamic Controls Corporation (120 
employees, aerospace engine components sector), Luminescent Systems mcorporated 
(130 employees, electrical lighting sector), and Quantic mdustries (250 employees, 
ordnance and accessories sector). 
Question 1. Has your firm been involved in an offset agreement? 
Large Firms. All four of the large firms interviewed responded that they were 
heavily involved in offset agreements. The firms indicated that offsets have become a 
routine practice in the international arms market and that most foreign customers will not 
consider a U.S. firm's bid unless an offer package is included. Some countries make the 
offset package their top selection priority. These four firms indicated that they were not 
enthusiastic about offsets but believed they were a necessary evil in order to stay 
competitive with other U.S. and international defense firms. 
Small- to Medium-Size Firms. Three of the small- to medium-sized firms 
indicated that they had been involved with their primes in designing portions of offset 
packages that dealt with ,their particular product. Although these firms were not 
enthusiastic participants in this process, they admitted that they would rather be involved 
and have some degree of say over what they would and would not contribute to the offset 
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effort. Three other fIrms indicated that they had not been involved in forming these 
agreements either directly or indirectly. The seventh fIrm indicated that it refused to 
participate with higher tiered contractors in formulating offset agreements. This fIrm 
would not participate because it believed offsets were a huge threat to their industry. 
Question 2. Has your firm been negatively affected by ~ffset agreements? 
Large Firms. All four of the interviewed large contractors cited one or more of 
the following negative effects: short term adverse effects on U.S. employment, certain 
offset packages create obligations (of varying periods of time) that must be satisfIed, 
some offset terms and conditions carry fInancial and political liabilities, and the design 
and fulfIllment of offset obligations requires fIrms to commit signifIcant overhead 
resources (fInancial and manpower) to these programs. All of the fIrms, however, 
claimed that these negative " effects were necessary in order"to make a sale. 
Small- to Medium-Size Firms. All of the small and medium sized firms indicated 
that they had experienced varying degrees of negative effects from offsets. These 
negative effects included loss of contracts to prime contractors, the introduction of new 
overseas comp~titors into their particular industrial sector, loss of U.S. market share in " 
particular sectors, and the necessity to reduce workers and facilities in order to trim their 
own costs. Six of the seven fIrms indicated that they had reduced employment during the 
last fIve years due to reduced business (they could not confirm that this loss of business 
was solely sue to offsets). One fIrm stated that they were in competition with a larger 
U.S. fIrm for an overseas sale and, although the smaller fIrm believed they had a better 
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product, the other firm was able to offer a more lucrative offset package and they won the 
bid. 
Question 3 .. Has your firm been positively affected by offset agreements? 
Large Firms. All four large contractors stated that offset packages promote sales 
which keep their employees at work, promotes trade, and aids in expandin~ their 
overseas markets. Offset agreements make them more competitive. They also stated that 
this positive effect - getting awarded a ~ontract - outweighed the negative effects. Also, 
some offset agreements have enabled them to find overseas contractors and suppliers that 
are less expensive than their U.S. counterparts. 
Small- to Medium-Size Firms .. Of the seven small- to medium-sized firms, only 
two of them reported that they had experienced any positive effects. In one case, the 
smalf firm's participation in an offset agreement allowed them to find a new market for 
their products overseas. In the other" case, the small company stated that without a" 
particUlar offset agreement, the contract of the prime which they are a subcontractor for 
probably would not have materialized. Thus, the offse.t package provided by the prime 
cQntractor helped the U.S. subcontractor obtain more work. 
Question 4. Is any type of legislation/regulation needed to control the use of 
offsets? How would your firm be affected by this control? 
Large Firms. The four large firms interviewed were very uncomfortable with the 
idea of further Government control although none of them believed that the amount of 
Government oversight would decrease in the foreseeable future. The firms indicated that 
they are already subject to audits by the GAO and are participating in Government 
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sponsored reporting and monitoring programs. Two of these firms indicated a great deal 
of frustration with all the different Government agencies and reporting requirements 
already associated with offsets. All of the large firms ·were concerned that further 
Government regulation would limit their ability to offer competitive offset packages and, 
thus, reduce their competitive stance in the global marketplace. All of these firms were 
adamantly against unilateral restrictions. This type of policy would disable them from 
competing a~ainst foreign competitors. All of them indicated they would support 
initiatives to limit the amount and use of offsets but only if other global suppliers also 
participated in these restrictions. Three of these contractors indicated that multilateral 
agreements would be far more effective than bilateral agreements. 
Small- to Medium-Size Firms. Six small-to medium-sized firms responded that 
they would welcome further Government involvement to help reduce offsets. Three of 
these contractors suggested that the Government should take a more active role in 
protecting key sectors within the defense industrial base. They indicated that this 
Government protection - either through aggressive export controls or some sort of 
Government subsidy - would ensure that vital industry and trade skills and knowledge 
would not leave U.S. shores. Like the large firms, these smaller companies were against 
unilateral restrictions. They recognized that this type of policy would hurt all sectors of 
the defense industry. 
Question 5. If no changes are made in how the defense industry utilizes 
offsets, what could be the long term consequences for your company? 
.. 
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Large Firms. The large firms stated that they would continue to have to formulate 
competitive offset agreements in order to maintain overseas business. One company 
predicted that they may have to decrease the defense portion of their business if required 
offset packages continued to increase monetarily. This spokesman stated that the 
company would pursue more dual-use technology markets where. the company would not 
have to become so burdened with offset agreements in order to make a sale. Another 
company spokesman predicted that it was possible that their company would be more 
willing to enter into joint agreements with allied nations to develop and produce weapons 
systems. Under stich joint agreements, all the participating countries would be partial 
owners of the final product. A much different buyer-seller relationship would 
materialize; one where offsets would not enter into the picture. 
Small- to Medium.:Size Firms. All seven small- tQ medium-sized firms indicated· 
that the continued use of offsets could squeeze them out of their particular market niche. 
If offsets continued to send work overseas and create new overseas competitors who 
could underbid U.S. companies, these smaller companies would either have to switch. 
·their line of b\1siness or go out of business. Three of these companies stated that the· 
defense share of their business revenues has steadily decreased over the last five years and 
that they are now looking to adapt their products to less defense related uses. 
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APPENDIX B. INPUT-OUTPUT TABLES 
The Input-Output (1-0) technique was developed by Wassily Leontief in the early' 
1930's. The 1-0 model describes a regional economy in terms of its sectors and attempts 
to provide a snapshot of the economy's structure by highlighting the interdependence 
between these sectors. It is based on the simple notion that the production of output 
requires inputs. These inputs can be semi-manufactured goods, raw materials, or inputs 
of services supplied by either households or the government. Having acquired inputs 
from other sectors, households, andlor government, a sector produces output and s~lls it 
either to the other producing sectors, to the final users (such as households or 
government), to residents of other regions, or to other firms for investment purposes 
(Walter, 1998). 1-0 takes into account the interdependence of the production plans and 
activities of the many industries which constitute an economy. This interdependence 
arises out of the fact that each industry employs the output of other industries as its raw 
materials. Its output, in tum, is often used by other producers as a productive factor, 
sometimes by those very industries from which it obtained its ingredients. For example, 
steel is used to make railroad cars and railroad cars are, in tum, used to transport steel and 
the coal and the pig iron which are used in its manufacture (Baumol, 1977). 
There are two important classes of variables in 1-0 analysis. The first is the 
number of sectors in a regional economy. The number of sectors depends on the purpose 
for which a particular 1-0 table is prepared. These sectors are usually defmed using the 
standard industrial classification (SIC) codes. Each sector is presented both as a seller 
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and buyer of regional and foreign output. The second variable is the sales and purchase 
record of each sector for a given time period (usually a calendar year). For sales and 
purchase records transactions tables are used. To draw a complete 1-0 table for a region, 
researchers also need data on the following variables: 1) production or output of each 
sector in the region; 2) sales and value added of every industry and firm within, each 
sector; 3) labor, raw material (local and foreign), and capital costs; 4) households 
consumption demand; and 5) government spending and tax collection. (Walter, 1998) 
Essentially, 1-0 tables are derived from solving a set of N simultaneous linear 
equations in N variables (the variables described above). When deriving the equations to 
construct 1-0 tables for different sectors of the economy, the size and complexity of these 
computations are dependent on both the number of sectors and transactions (Sydsaeter, 
1995). The 1-0 calculations associated with determining the effects of both direct and 
indirect offsets on the defense industrial base involve thousands of variables and present 
an enormous statistical problem for the researcher. 
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